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Introduction	Courts	 have	 often	 been	 confronted	 with	 publishers’	 misbehaviour	 and	 have	 compensated	claimants,	occasionally	quite	generously,	where	certain	features	of	a	case	have	exacerbated	the	injury	 caused	 by	 a	 defamatory	 statement	 and	 aggravated	 the	 damages.1	 While	 there	 is	 a	substantial	 body	 of	 authority	 emphasising	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 reprehensibility	 of	 defendants’	conduct	 on	 the	 size	 of	 libel	 awards,	 the	 effect	 of	 claimants’	 behaviour	 on	 the	 assessment	 of	damages	has	been	the	subject	of	the	courts’	enquiry	less	frequently.	The	claimants’	bad	reputation	and	provocation	can	mitigate	damages,	and	are	covered	by	some	authority,2	but	the	precise	effect	of	a	claimant’s	misconduct	on	the	award	has	not	been	settled	by	judicial	determination	and	has	received	little	academic	consideration.	This	article	aims	to	address	this	gap.	More	specifically,	this	article	is	concerned	with	defamation	cases	where	the	court	concluded	in	its	 findings	after	proof	 that	a	claimant	who	succeeded	on	the	 issue	of	 liability	behaved	before	action	or	during	 the	 course	of	 litigation	 in	 a	dishonest	or	disreputable	manner.	This	 includes	conduct	which	was	not	necessarily	connected	causally	to	the	publication	of	the	libel	complained	of,	but	was	seen	by	judges	as	culpable	to	a	degree	that	warranted	a	reduction	of	damages	to	a	minimum	level	(e.g.	lies	given	in	evidence).3	The	article	argues	that	such	an	approach	does	not	cohere	with	that	adopted	in	other	branches	of	tort,	where	claimants’	misbehaviour	does	not	affect	the	level	of	general	damages	awarded,	and	carries	with	it	the	risk	of	eroding	the	vindicatory	goal	of	 libel	 law.	This	concern	is	equally	profound	when	considered	in	light	of	the	new	contours	of	defamation	claims.	As	explained	 later,	 the	effect	of	 the	 ‘serious	harm’	standard	enacted	 in	 the	Defamation	Act	2013	is	to	‘stiffen	the	common	threshold	test’.4	Claimants	who	have	advanced	a	sufficient	case	on	serious	reputational	harm,	by	reference	to	the	seriousness	of	the	imputation	conveyed	by	the	words	used,	can	reasonably	be	expected	to	have	a	strong	sense	of	worry	over	the	adverse	consequences	of	serious	defamatory	imputations.	Important	questions	thus	arise	as	to	 whether	 derisory	 awards	 alone	 are	 sufficient	 to	 eradicate,	 or	 at	 least	 minimise,	 the	unfavourable	impressions	created	by	the	severity	of	the	offending	statements.	The	article	first	explores	the	interplay	between	the	size	of	an	award	and	the	vindicatory	function	of	libel	damages,	which	is	a	significant	but	comparatively	neglected	aspect	within	modern	tort	law	scholarship,	despite	being	deeply	ingrained	in	the	internal	structure	of	defamation.5	As	will	be	discussed,	this	vindicatory	aspect	concerns	the	attitude	of	others	towards	the	claimant	and	requires	 that	 the	 award	 is	 of	 sufficient	 magnitude	 to	 signal	 to	 the	 world	 that	 the	 allegation	complained	of	is	unfounded.	A	judge	may	find	it	necessary	to	inflate	the	final	award	in	order	to	satisfy	 this	vindicatory	element.	But,	where	 the	claimant’s	conduct	 is	open	 to	criticism	by	 the	court,	 a	 judge	may	also	explicitly	make	a	 lower	award	because	his	or	her	 reasoned	 judgment																																																														1	Sutcliffe	v	Pressdram	Ltd	[1991]	1	QB	153,	184	(Nourse	LJ);	John	v	MGN	Ltd	[1997]	QB	586,	616;	John	Clement	Carpenter	Gatley,	Gatley	on	Libel	and	Slander	(12th	ed,	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2017)	9.18.	2	Scott	v	Sampson	(1882)	8	QBD	491.	3	For	a	discussion	of	cases	where	it	is	established	as	a	result	of	preliminary	proof,	or	it	transpires	during	proof,	that	litigants	have	set	out	to	put	the	fairness	of	the	trial	in	jeopardy	by	fraudulent	means,	see	The	Rt	Hon	Lord	Reed,	‘Lies,	Damned	Lies:	Abuse	of	Process	and	the	Dishonest	Litigant’,	lecture	delivered	at	the	University	of	Edinburgh	in	October	2012	as	the	5th	Annual	Lecture	at	the	Centre	for	Commercial	Law	<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-121026.pdf>	accessed	28	May	2018	4	Gatley	(n	1)	1.1.	5	Jason	Varuhas,	‘The	Concept	of	“Vindication”	in	the	Law	of	Torts:	Rights,	Interests	and	Damages’	(2014)	34(2)	OJLS	253.	
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offered	 vindication.6	 Adopting	 a	 doctrinal	 approach	 involving	 the	 interpretative,	 qualitative	analysis	of	primary	 legal	 texts	and	secondary	 literature,7	 the	article	also	evaluates	settled	and	emerging	 principles	 concerning	 the	 claimant’s	 conduct	 as	 a	 mitigating	 factor	 in	 assessing	damages.	With	this	essential	context	established,	the	article	then	moves	on	to	consider	what	insights	can	be	gleaned	from	the	position	of	claimants	who	had	had	their	reputation	disparaged	and	claimed	substantial	 damages	 yet	 received,	 partly	 because	of	 their	 perceived	dishonesty	 in	 the	past	 or	disreputable	 conduct	 of	 their	 case,	 only	 negligible	 awards.	 In	 such	 cases,	 vindication	 is	predominantly	found	in	the	judges’	reasons.	However,	such	an	outcome	does	not	sit	well	together	with	the	libel	courts’	recognition	that	vindication	is	very	much	closely	aligned	to	the	size	of	the	award	and	the	public	perceptions	that	result	from	it.	There	may	thus,	understandably,	be	some	scepticism	about	the	extent	to	which	nominal	damages,	coupled	with	a	ruling	containing	express	elements	of	vindication,	can	solely	be	relied	upon	to	redress	the	interference	with	a	claimant’s	reputational	 interests.	 In	 considering	 this	 issue,	 the	 discussion	 juxtaposes	 the	 libel	 courts’	approach	with	that	adopted	by	the	courts	in	other	tortious	actions	with	respect	to	decreasing	the	level	of	a	dishonest	claimant’s	award.	The	Supreme	Court	has,	in	particular,	rejected	arguments	in	 favour	of	reducing	the	general	damages	 for	a	genuine	personal	 injury	on	the	ground	that	a	claim	 had	 been	 supported	 by	 dishonest	 devices,	 and	 held	 that	 the	 claimant	 was	 entitled	 to	damages	in	an	ascertained	sum,	irrespective	of	his	conduct.8	But,	as	the	analysis	demonstrates,	the	law	of	defamation	appears	to	be	moving	towards	a	different	direction.	It	 is	 suggested	 that	 libel	 courts’	 increasingly	 unhesitant	 and	 robustly	 critical	 evaluation	 of	claimants’	behaviour	constitutes	evidence	that	English	judges	have	begun	working	towards	the	imposition	of	a	merits-based	approach,	akin	to	the	‘clean	hands’9	doctrine	applicable	to	equity	cases,	thereby	requiring	a	claimant	to	be	‘deserving’	before	and	during	the	course	of	litigation.	However,	 an	 implication	 of	 this	 peculiar	 dissociation	 of	 the	 tort	 of	 defamation	 from	 other	branches	of	tort	law	may	be	a	form	of	unhealthy	dissonance,	whereby	the	purported	vindicatory	purpose	ascribed	 to	minimal	or	derisory	awards	 is	 rather	 faint,	with	 some	measure	of	 solace	possibly	 derived	 only	 from	 the	 court’s	 final	 judgment	 on	 the	merits.	 Concerns	 as	 to	whether	claimants	may	ultimately	leave	the	court	under-vindicated	and	perhaps	unfairly	compensated	are	no	less	acute	following	the	statutory	imposition	of	a	threshold	of	seriousness	in	the	2013	Act.		Importantly,	in	an	age	of	rapidly	evolving	communication	technologies,	which	provide	new	tools	for	widespread	 dissemination	 and	 retrieval	 of	 information,	 the	 role	 and	 effect	 of	 vindication	becomes	crucial,	particularly	where	the	defendant	has	not	offered	to	make	a	public	apology.	The	old	cliché	that	‘today’s	newspaper	pages	are	tomorrow’s	fish	and	chip	wrapping’	no	longer	holds	true.	The	long-term	effect	of	libel	is	stronger	now	and	can	be	described	as	being	analogous	to	a	tattoo;10	it	is	extremely	difficult	to	get	rid	of	and	even	if	one	tries	to,	there	is	still	a	shadow	left.	Thus,	the	libel	courts’	emerging	practice	raises	the	difficult	issue	of	how	far	a	judge	sitting	alone																																																														6	Barron	and	Anr	v	Vines	[2016]	EWHC	1226,	[21]	(Warby	J);	Zahawi	v	Press	TV	[2017]	EWHC	1010,	[15]	(Master	McCloud).	7	Terry	Hutchinson	and	Nigel	Duncan,	‘Defining	and	describing	what	we	do:	doctrinal	legal	research’	(2012)	17(1)	Deakin	Law	Review	83.	8	Fairclough	Homes	Ltd	v	Summers	[2012]	UKSC	26	(27	June	2012).	9	John	McGhee,	Snell’s	Equity	(33rd	ed,	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2017)	5-010;	see	also	Grobbelaar	v	News	Group	
Newspapers	Ltd	and	Anor	[2002]	UKHL	40,	[90]	(Lord	Scott).	10	Clarke	(t/a	Elumina	Iberica	UK)	v	Bain	[2008]	EWHC	2636,	[55]	(Tugendhat	J).	
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should	reduce	an	underserving	claimant’s	award	on	the	grounds	of	the	vindicatory	effect	of	their	carefully	 reasoned	 judgment.	 The	 next	 section	 provides	 the	 background	 against	 which	 these	matters	need	to	be	considered.	
Vindication	and	libel	damages	in	the	post	2013	Defamation	Act	climate	There	 is	 no	 general	 power	 in	 defamation	 law	 to	 order	 a	 defendant	 to	 publish	 an	 apology	 or	suitable	 correction	 and	 therefore	 damages	 tend	 to	 be	 the	 primary	 remedy	 in	 such	 claims.11	Damages	compensating	a	claimant	for	loss	of	reputation	are	at	large	in	relation	to	both	libel	and	slander,12	namely	they	are	not	limited	to	the	pecuniary	loss	that	can	be	specifically	proved	and	calculated.13	 The	 advent	 of	 the	 Defamation	 Act	 2013	 has	 not	 displaced	 the	 common	 law	presumption	of	damage	to	reputation,14	and	thus	an	award	of	damages	can	be	made	on	the	basis	of	presumed	loss.	Moreover,	an	award	must	serve	three	intertwined	and	synergistic	purposes:	it	is	required	to	compensate	a	claimant	for	unquantifiable	damage	to	his	reputation	flowing	from	the	libel;	vindicate	his	good	name;	and	provide	an	element	of	solatium	to	the	claimant	for	the	‘distress,	hurt	and	humiliation’	caused	by	the	publication	at	issue.15	All	three	of	these	purposes	appear	to	reflect	the	significance	attached	to	the	value	of	an	individual’s	reputation	as	an	aspect	of	his	or	her	property,	honour	and	dignity.16		Substantial	 defamation	 damages	 are	 often	 awarded	 by	 way	 of	 giving	 effect	 to	 the	 protected	interests.17	 Since	 the	 latest	 libel	 reforms	which	 resulted	 in	 the	passage	of	 the	Defamation	Act	2013,	damages	have	ranged	from	£18,000	to	£200,000.18	The	size	of	an	award	is	dependent	on	the	relative	extent	of	the	interference	with	a	claimant’s	reputational	interests	and	not	necessarily	on	 its	 specific	 consequential	 effects	 on	 a	 particular	 claimant.19	 Defamation	 damages	must	 be																																																														11	A	final	injunction	preventing	further	publication	of	the	defamatory	statement	may	accompany	an	award	of	damages.	Interim	injunctions	ordered	before	publication	are	more	controversial	remedies.	The	rule	against	prior	restraints	is	strengthened	by	s	12	of	the	HRA	1998	concerning	interim	reliefs.	12	Christian	Witting,	Street	on	Torts	(14th	ed,	OUP	2015)	584.	13	Rookes	v	Barnard	[1964]	AC	1129,	1221	(Lord	Devlin).	14	Lachaux	v	Independent	Print	Ltd	&	Evening	Standard	Ltd	[2017]	EWCA	Civ	1334,	[58]	and	[82]	(Davis	LJ).		15	John	(n	1)	607E-F	(Sir	Thomas	Bingham	MR);	Cairns	v	Modi;	KC	v	MGN	Ltd	[2012]	EWCA	Civ	1382,	[21]	(Judge	LCJ).	16	Eric	Barendt,	‘What	is	the	Point	of	Libel	Law?’	(1999)	52(1)	Current	Legal	Problems	110,	115;	Broome	v	
Cassell	&	Co	Ltd	[1972]	AC	1027,	1070	(Lord	Hailsham);	see	further	Robert	Post,	‘The	Social	Foundations	of	Defamation	Law:	Reputation	and	the	Constitution’	(1986)	74(3)	California	Law	Review	691.	17	Rantzen	v	Mirror	Group	Newspapers	(1986)	Ltd	and	Ors	[1994]	QB	670,	696	(Neill	LJ);	Hourani	v	
Thompson	and	Ors	[2017]	EWHC	432,	[237]	(Warby	J).	18	See	Zahawi	(n	6)	(£200,000);	Rahman	v	ARY	Network	Ltd	[2016]	EWHC	3110	(£185,000);	Al-Amoudi	v	
Kifle	and	Anr	[2013]	EWHC	293	(£180,000);	Cruddas	v	Calvert,	Blake	and	Times	Newspapers	Ltd	[2013]	EWHC	2298	(£180,000	but	reduced	to	£50,000	on	appeal);	Harrath	v	Stand	for	Peace	Ltd	and	Anr	[2017]	EWHC	653	(£140,000).	Comparatively	lower	awards	were	made	in:	Sooben	v	Badal	[2017]	EWHC	2638	(70,000);	Hourani	(n	17)	(80,000);	Flood	v	Times	Newspapers	Ltd	[2013]	EWHC	4075	(£60,000);	Garcia	v	
Associated	Newspapers	Ltd	[2014]	EWHC	3137	(£45,000);	Barron	v	Collins	[2017]	EWHC	162	(£54,000);	
Lisle-Mainwaring	v	Associated	Newspapers	Ltd	and	Anr	[2017]	EWHC	543	(£54,000);	Monroe	v	Hopkins	[2017]	EWHC	433	(£24,000);	Kadir	&	Barakah	UK	Ltd	v	Channel	S	Television	[2014]	EWHC	2305	(£20,000);	Barron	(n	6)	(£40,000);	Oyston	and	Ors	v	Ragozzino	[2015]	EWHC	3232	(£20,000);	and	
Woodward	v	Grice	[2017]	EWHC	1292	(£18,000).	19	Varuhas	(n	5)	283.	However,	characteristics	specific	to	a	claimant,	like	the	subjective	impact	of	the	libel	on	them,	may	be	considered;	see	Cruddas	v	Adams	[2013]	EWHC	145,	[48]	–	[49]	(Eady	J).	In	this	case,	the	defamatory	allegations	that	Mr	Cruddas	was	‘a	criminal	who	deserved	to	be	behind	bars’	were	found	to	
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enough	to	provide	reasonable	compensation	but	because	an	award	represents	an	interference	with	Convention	rights,	it	must	be	proportionate	to	the	injury	suffered	by	a	claimant	and	no	more	than	necessary	to	‘re-establish	his	reputation’.20	Several	factors	are	considered	by	libel	courts	in	assessing	the	seriousness	of	the	interference.	The	gravity	of	the	defamatory	imputation	is	a	major	determinant	 of	 damages:	 ‘the	 more	 closely	 it	 touches	 the	 plaintiff's	 personal	 integrity,	professional	reputation,	honour,	courage,	loyalty	and	the	core	attributes	of	his	personality,	the	more	serious	it	is	likely	to	be’.21	The	extent	of	the	publication	is	also	another	relevant	factor:	‘a	libel	published	to	millions	has	a	greater	potential	 to	cause	damage	than	a	 libel	published	to	a	handful	of	people’.22	In	a	landscape	of	modern	technology	and	communication	systems,	the	court	will	also	consider	the	tendency	of	damaging	statements	to	percolate	and	‘go	viral’	via	the	Internet	more	quickly	 than	ever	before.23	Damages	 for	 injury	 to	 feelings	may	be	 included	 in	a	 general	award	and	can	be	significant,	as	a	court	must	take	into	consideration	what	the	claimant	‘thinks	other	people	are	thinking	of	him’.24	In	a	nutshell,	it	is	well-established	that	a	court’s	conclusion	must	ensure	that	a	claimant	obtains	adequate	 vindication	 of	 the	 baselessness	 of	 the	 published	 allegations	 as	 well	 as	 suitable	compensation	for	the	injury	caused	to	his	reputation	and	feelings	both	by	the	libel	and	by	conduct	after	publication	(e.g.	the	wounding	way	in	which	the	proceedings	were	conducted	on	behalf	of	the	 defendant	may	 aggravate	 damages).	 Even	 though	 vindication	 is	 recognised	 as	 an	 express	purpose	of	defamation	damages,	 its	meaning	seems	to	have	most	often	been	accepted	by	libel	courts	as	self-explanatory.	Essentially,	its	gist	can	be	captured	as	repairing	the	harm	caused	to	a	claimant’s	perceived	status	and	the	esteem	in	which	he	or	she	is	held	by	others.25		There	is	some	lack	of	definite	conviction	as	to	which	aspects	of	defamation	proceedings	effect	vindication.26	A	claimant	may	obtain	some	measure	of	vindication	 from	a	reasoned	 judgment,	giving	the	judge’s	conclusions	and	detailed	reasons	for	reaching	them.	In	particular,	the	Court	of	Appeal	articulated	in	Purnell27	a	rather	moderate	position	on	this	matter,	holding	that	in	principle	‘a	 prior	 narrative	 judgment	 rejecting	 a	 defence	 of	 justification	 and	 so	 holding	 the	 libel	 to	 be	established	is	capable	of	providing	some	vindication	of	a	claimant’s	reputation’.28	The	degree	of	vindication	 will,	 however,	 almost	 invariably	 depend	 on	 the	 circumstances.	 For	 instance,	 a	claimant	can	secure	some	vindication	from	a	reasoned	judgment	following	a	hotly	litigated	trial	(possibly	 accompanied	 by	 a	 fair	 amount	 of	 attendant	 publicity)	 in	 which	 the	 defendant’s	witnesses	were	 thoroughly	discredited	and	a	 firm	 finding	 in	his	or	her	 favour	was	arrived	at.	Nevertheless,	the	court	recognised	in	Purnell	that	the	effect	of	such	an	earlier	judgment	vis-à-vis	vindication	 would	 most	 likely	 be	 ‘marginal’29	 and	 that	 there	 would	 also	 be	 cases	 where	 a																																																														have	gravely	damaged	his	personal	reputation	which	was	‘intimately	linked’	to	that	of	his	business;	see	also	Michael	Jones	(ed),	Clerk	and	Lindsell	on	Torts	(22nd	ed,	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2017)	22-226.	20	Rantzen	(n	17)	696	(Neill	LJ).	21	John	(n	1)	607	(Sir	Thomas	Bingham	MR).	22	Ibid;	see	also	Gathercole	v	Miall	(1846)	15	M	&	W	319,	331	(Pollock	CB).	23	Cairns	(n	15)	[27]	(Judge	LCJ).	24	Broome	(n	16)	1125	(Lord	Diplock).	25	David	Rolph,	Reputation,	Celebrity	and	Defamation	Law	(Routledge	2016)	44.	26	David	Rolph,	‘Vindicating	Reputation	and	Privacy’	in	Andrew	Kenyon	(ed),	Comparative	Defamation	and	
Privacy	Law	(CUP	2016)	296.	27	Purnell	v	Business	Magazine	Ltd	[2007]	EWCA	Civ	744.	28	Ibid	[29]	(Laws	LJ,	with	whom	the	other	two	members	of	the	court	agreed).	29	Ibid.	
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judgment	would	provide	 ‘no	or	no	significant	or	reckonable	vindication’,30	 for	example,	where	judgment	 was	 granted	 in	 default	 and	 there	 was	 no	 contested	 decision	 on	 the	 merits.31	 It	 is	eminently	plausible	that	the	terms	of	a	judgment	cannot	sensibly	be	viewed	as	a	substitute	for	a	sum	 which	 can	 be	 pointed	 to	 as	 affording	 appropriate	 vindication.	 Thus,	 a	 prior	 reasoned	judgment	in	the	claimant’s	favour	does	not	negate	any	requirement	to	have	vindication	reflected	in	the	damages.	
Vindication	in	compensatory	(general)	damages	Although	vindication	is	identified	as	a	purpose	of	damages	distinct	from	that	of	compensation,	the	English	courts’	preference	is	to	treat	it	as	an	intrinsic	part	of	compensation	for	libel.	Judges	have	frequently	emphasised	the	imperative	need	to	vindicate	the	claimant’s	reputation	through	an	effective	remedy,	citing	Lord	Radcliffe	words	in	Dingle	that	‘a	libel	action	is	fundamentally	an	action	to	vindicate	a	man’s	reputation	on	some	point	as	to	which	he	has	been	falsely	defamed,	and	the	damages	awarded	have	to	be	regarded	as	the	demonstrative	mark	of	that	vindication’.32	In	
Uren	v	John	Fairfax	&	Sons	Pty	Ltd,	Windeyer	J	spoke	of	compensatory	damages	as	a	vindication	of	the	claimant	to	the	public.	His	observations	are	particularly	instructive:	a	man	defamed	does	not	get	compensation	for	his	damaged	reputation.	He	gets	damages	because	he	was	injured	in	his	reputation,	that	is	simply	because	he	was	publicly	defamed.	For	this	reason,	compensation	by	damages	operates	in	two	ways	-	as	a	vindication	of	the	plaintiff	to	the	public	and	as	 consolation	 to	him	 for	 a	wrong	done.	Compensation	 is	here	a	 solatium	rather	 than	a	monetary	recompense	for	harm	measurable	in	money.33	Windeyer	J’s	words	were	approved	by	the	House	of	Lords	in	Broome	v	Cassell34	and	the	emphasis	on	vindication	has	become	more	pronounced	since	then.	‘If	the	award	fails	to	achieve	vindication	it	 fails	properly	to	compensate’,35	Warby	J	observed	in	Sloutsker.	 In	Metropolitan	International	
Schools,	 a	 £50,000	 award	 for	 an	 Internet	 libel	 alleging	 that	 the	 claimant’s	 distance	 learning	courses	were	a	scam	was	principally	for	‘vindication’.36	The	vindicatory	aspect	of	damages	was	in	
Farrall	 ‘very	much	in	play’,37	especially	in	the	absence	of	a	retraction	or	apology,	following	the	online	 publication	 of	 an	 unwarranted	 slur	 which	 attacked	 a	 young	 solicitor’s	 professional	competency	 and	 probity.	 Moreover,	 although	 the	 claim	 form	 in	 Harrath	 indicated	 that	 the	claimant	did	not	expect	to	recover	more	than	£10,000	over	false	terrorism	allegations	posted	on	a	website	with	a	readership	in	the	hundreds	or	low	thousands,	Sir	David	Eady	assessed	damages	at	 £140,000	 to	 ensure	 that	 ‘no	 doubt	 [was	 left]	 in	 the	mind	 of	 a	 reasonable	 onlooker	 of	 the	claimant’s	 entitlement	 to	 vindication’.38	 And	 in	 ZAM	 v	 CFW,	 Tugendhat	 J	 remarked	 that	 ‘the	primary	object	of	libel	actions	is	to	vindicate	a	claimant’s	reputation;	not	to	recover	damages’.39		
																																																													30	Ibid	[30].	31	Al-Amoudi	v	Kifle	[2011]	EWHC	2037,	[38]	(HHJ	Richard	Parkes).	32	Dingle	v	Associated	Newspapers	[1964]	AC	371,	396	(Lord	Radcliffe).	33	(1966)	117	CLR	118,	151	(emphasis	in	the	original).	34	Broome	(n	16)	1071	(Lord	Hailsham).	35	Sloutsker	v	Romanova	(Rev	1)	[2015]	EWHC	2053,	[77].	36	Metropolitan	International	Schools	Ltd	v	Designtechnica	Corp	[2010]	EWHC	2411,	[35]	(Tugendhat	J);		37	Farrall	v	Kordowski	[2011]	EWHC	2140	(Lloyd	Jones	J).	38	Harrath	(n	18)	[23].	39	[2013]	EWHC	662,	[72].	
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Nevertheless,	an	award	of	libel	damages	is	part	of	the	process	which	seeks	to	reverse	the	effect	of	the	infringement	with	the	claimant’s	reputational	interests.	As	Barker	astutely	observes,		since	reputational	damage	actually	consists	in	a	deleterious	change	in	the	public	perception	of	a	person,	 its	 remediation	 entails	 an	 equivalent	 change	 for	 the	 better	 in	 that	 perception	 and	monetary	sums	are	calculated	symbolically	with	this	objective	in	mind.40	The	vindicatory	function	of	the	award	and	its	size	are	tightly	–	but	also	intricately	–	interwoven.	The	 chances	 of	 the	 courts	 interfering	 with	 a	 publisher’s	 editorial	 freedom	 and	 ordering	retractions	or	apologies	are	likely	to	be	extremely	remote,	so	the	importance	attached	to	the	size	of	an	award	becomes	even	more	apparent:	in	order	to	fully	redress	the	injury	to	the	claimant’s	reputation,	the	level	of	damages	must	be	sufficient	to	apprise	the	community	that	the	defendant	has	been	‘publicly	proclaimed	to	have	inflicted	a	serious	injury’.41	The	vindicatory	aspect	may	be	underlined	by	increasing	an	award	to	the	top	of	the	range	which	is	deemed	suitable	under	the	circumstances.42	The	notional	ceiling	for	compensatory	damages	in	libel	proceedings,	which	is	arrived	at	by	reference	to	the	top	figure	for	pain,	suffering	and	loss	of	amenity	in	personal	injury	claims,43	 is	currently	accepted	to	be	of	the	order	of	£300,000.	Such	awards	are	though	reserved	for	the	gravest	cases	involving	for	instance	widespread	imputations	of	murder	or	terrorism.44	Introducing,	however,	an	element	of	vindication	in	libel	damages	may	be	thought	to	risk	transforming	the	award	into	an	unmerited	windfall	for	the	claimant.	Indeed,	the	size	of	defamation	awards	was	in	the	past	a	source	of	concern.45	There	was	suspicion	that	the	jury	made,	under	the	mask	of	vindicating	a	claimant’s	reputation,	excessively	high	awards	which	were,	in	essence,	vindictive	penalties	against	media	defendants.	However,	following	the	abolition	of	the	presumption	in	favour	of	a	jury	trial,46	the	assessment	of	damages	will	rarely	be	left	for	the	jury’s	consideration.	It	is	now	a	matter	for	the	judge	sitting	alone,	and	a	consequence	of	this	is	that	a	more	realistic	and	‘more	or	less	coherent’47	framework	of	awards	has	been	built	up.																																																														40	Kit	Barker,	‘Private	and	Public:	The	Mixed	Concept	of	Vindication	in	Torts	and	Private	Law’	in	Stephen	Pitel,	Jason	Neyers	and	Erika	Chamberlain	(eds),	Tort	Law:	Challenging	Orthodoxy	(Hart	Publishing,	2013)	76.	41	The	Gleaner	Co	Ltd	v	Abrahams	[2003]	UKPC	55,	[55]	(Lord	Hoffman).	42	John	(n	1)	607E-F	(Sir	Thomas	Bingham	MR);	Jameel	v	Wall	Street	Journal	Europe	SPRL	[2006]	UKHL	44,	[24]	(Lord	Bingham	of	Cornhill);	McCarey	v	Associated	Newspapers	Ltd	and	Ors	(No	2)	[1965]	2	QB	86,	105	(Pearson	LJ).	43	Barron	v	Collins	(n	18),	[26].	44	Rai	v	Bholowasia	[2015]	EWHC	382,	[179]	(HHJ	Parkes	QC);	Barron	v	Collins	(n	18)	[26];	Harrath	(n	18);	Lisle-Mainwaring	(n	18)	[62].	The	ceiling	figure	rises	with	inflation	but	its	increase	since	2012,	when	Tugendhat	J	noted	in	Cairns	(n	15)	[25]	and	ZAM	(n	39)	[65]	that	it	was	about	£275,000,	is	also	a	consequence	of	Simmons	v	Castle	[2012]	EWCA	Civ	1039,	in	which	the	Court	of	Appeal	set	guidelines	on	the	level	of	general	damages	for	all	types	of	non-pecuniary	loss	in	all	civil	actions,	at	10	per	cent	higher	with	effect	from	1	April	2013.	45	See	John	(n	1)	608,	where	Lord	Bingham	famously	described	the	jurors	as	being	in	a	position	of	‘sheep	loosed	on	an	unfenced	common,	with	no	shepherd’,	lacking	an	instinctive	sense	of	where	to	pitch	their	award.	The	jury’s	discretion	in	assessing	damages	is	not,	however,	unfettered.	The	Courts	and	Legal	Services	Act	1990,	s	8	empowers	the	Court	of	Appeal	to	level	down	what	it	may	consider	to	be	extravagant	damages	and	substitute	a	‘proper	award’	without	being	invited	to	so	by	the	parties;	see	John	(n	1),	McCartan	Turkington	Breen	v	Times	Newspapers	Ltd	[2001]	2	AC	277	and	Kiam	v	MGN	Ltd	[2002]	EWCA	Civ	43,	in	which	the	Court	of	Appeal	provided	further	guidance	on	when	and	how	this	power	should	be	exercised.	46	Defamation	Act	2013,	s	11.	47	Barron	v	Vines	(n	6)	[81]	(Warby	J).	
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Notwithstanding	the	centrality	of	vindication	to	the	stated	purposes	of	defamation	damages,	its	relationship	to	the	award	remains	relatively	obscure.	Although	compensatory	damages	can	be	inflated	to	vindicate	a	claimant’s	‘good	name’	and	restore	their	social	standing,	it	is	uncertain	how	the	need	for	vindication	precisely	affects	the	assessment	of	an	award	and	how	the	vindicatory	effect	on	third	parties	can	be	measured.	An	illustration	of	this	point	can	be	found	in	the	recent	case	 of	 Pirtek,48	 where	 the	 claimant	 company,	 which	 provides	 hydraulic	 hose	 replacement	services	 to	 the	 industry,	 brought	 a	 libel	 claim	 against	 a	 former	 franchisee	who	 carried	 out	 a	campaign	 online	 (and	 via	 social	 media	 postings)	 disparaging	 the	 company’s	 products	 and	services.	Warby	J	held	that	the	allegations	tended	to	cause	serious	financial	loss	to	the	claimant49	and	awarded	 the	maximum	permissible	under	 the	Defamation	Act	1996,50	explaining	 that	 the	gravity	 of	 the	 statements	 at	 issue	 called	 for	 a	 ‘substantial	 vindicatory	 award’.51	 And	 in	Flood,	which	involved	an	article	claiming	that	there	were	strong	grounds	to	believe	that	a	police	officer	was	dishonest	and	corrupt,	it	was	felt	that	The	Times’	persistence	in	the	allegation	and	failure	to	inform	 its	 readers	 of	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 investigation	 which	 exonerated	 the	 claimant,	represented	a	‘particular	need’52	for	vindication	requiring	a	‘proper’53	sum	by	way	of	damages.	However,	it	is	difficult	to	find	any	additional	evidence	in	the	judgments	that	would	help	clarify	the	distinct	weight	attached	 to	vindication	as	a	 factor	 in	 the	assessment	of	damages.	 It	 is	not	unreasonable	to	suppose	that	it	is	hard	to	disentangle	vindication	from	the	other	two	interlocking	aims	of	libel	damages	but	some	degree	of	uncertainty	over	its	relationship	with	the	award	may	be	 removed,	 if	 vindication	 is	 regarded	 predominantly	 as	 ‘a	 check	 on	 the	 award’	 assessed	 by	reference	to	solace	and	reparation:	it	reminds	the	court	to	adjust	the	level	of	the	overall	award,	so	that	it	is	‘sufficient	to	impress	on	the	community	that	the	defamation	was	wrongful	and	has	been	effectively	remedied’.54		
Vindication	in	exemplary,	aggravated	and	nominal	damages	Compensatory	awards,	which	are	calculated	 -	 to	 the	extent	 that	money	can	do	so	 -	 to	put	 the	claimant	 in	 the	 same	 position	 he	 or	 she	 would	 have	 been,	 absent	 the	 defendant’s	 tortious	conduct,55	may	be	supplemented	by	aggravated	or	exemplary	damages.	Nominal	damages	can	also	be	awarded	where	a	claimant	is	technically	successful	in	establishing	that	his	or	her	legal	right	has	been	infringed	but	cannot	show	any	factual	loss	or	real	(recognised)	harm	as	a	result	of	the	libellous	publication.	These	three	types	of	damages	(aggravated,	exemplary,	nominal)	vary	in	their	relative	vindicatory	force	and	the	priority	they	place	on	‘making	good’	the	claimant’s	name	and	place	in	public.	Exemplary	damages	are	available	only	in	limited	cases	and	where	the	sum	awarded	by	way	of	compensation	is	not	sufficient	to	‘punish	for	outrageous	conduct,	to	mark	the	jury’s	disapproval	
																																																													48	Pirtek	(UK)	Ltd	v	Jackson	[2017]	EWHC	2834.	49	Defamation	Act	2013,	s	1(2).	50	Defamation	Act	1996,	s	9(1)(c).	Where	the	summary	procedure	under	ss	8-10	of	the	Act	applies,	damages	are	capped	at	£10,000.	51	Pirtek	(n	48)	[75].	52	Flood	(n	18)	[59]	(Davies	J).	53	Ibid.	54	Normann	Witzleb	and	Robyn	Carroll,	‘The	role	of	vindication	in	torts	damages’	(2009)	17	Tort	Law	Review	16,	35.	55	Livingstone	v	The	Rawyards	Coal	Company	(1880)	5	App	Cas	25,	39	(Lord	Blackburn).	
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of	such	conduct,	and	to	deter	a	repetition’.56	In	the	context	of	libel,	a	court	must	be	satisfied	that	the	defendant	did	not	believe	in	the	truth	of	what	he	or	she	had	published	and	had	been	motivated	by	 ‘a	 cynical	 calculation	 that	publication	was	 to	his	mercenary	advantage’.57	On	a	micro-level,	exemplary	damages	may	be	deemed	 ‘analogous	 to	a	criminal	penalty’,58	but	 the	underpinning	policy	of	the	law	is	to	‘teach	the	defendant	and	others	that	“tort	does	not	pay”	by	demonstrating	what	 consequences	 the	 law	 inflicts	 rather	 than	 simply	 to	make	 the	defendant	 suffer	 an	 extra	penalty	for	what	he	has	done’.59	The	fact	that	the	civil	law	takes	the	exceptional	step	of	punishing	a	 defendant	 for	 the	 manner	 of	 their	 interference	 with	 a	 claimant’s	 reputational	 interests	reinforces	the	importance	attached	to	these	and	further	suggests	that	exemplary	damages	can	also	be	seen	as	playing	a	vindicatory	role	on	a	macro-level.60	The	Crime	and	Courts	Act	2013	now	puts	exemplary	damages	on	a	statutory	footing	and	gives	the	courts	a	fairly	wide	discretion	to	make	 such	 awards,	 if	 claimed,	 where	 the	 defendant’s	 conduct	 demonstrated	 ‘a	 deliberate	 or	reckless	disregard	of	an	outrageous	nature	for	the	claimant’s	rights’.61	However,	publishers	who	were	voluntarily	signed	up	at	the	material	time	to	an	approved	regulatory	body	under	the	post-Leveson	Royal	Charter	system	enjoy	a	limited	immunity	from	exemplary	damages.62	General	 damages	may	 be	 aggravated	 by	 the	 ‘extraordinary’63	 conduct	 of	 the	 defendant,	 their	conduct	of	the	case	or	their	state	of	mind.	A	maliciously	published	libel,	for	example,	is	likely	to	be	 more	 hurtful	 than	 a	 libel	 which	 was	 erroneously	 published	 and	 expeditiously	 corrected.	Aggravated	damages	can	be	recovered	for	‘injury	to	pride	and	dignity,	and	the	consequence	of	humiliation’64	and	as	such	they	represent	a	more	generous	sum	than	a	more	moderate	award	which	would	 typically	 be	 given	 to	 a	 claimant.65	 For	 instance,	 Eady	 J	 awarded	 the	 claimant	 in	
Johnson	£70,000	by	way	of	compensatory	and	aggravated	damages	for	libel,	following	a	sustained	attack	upon	him	by	the	defendant	through	blogs	and	Twitter	accounts.66	The	Law	Commission	recommended	 as	 far	 back	 as	 1997	 that	 this	 head	 of	 damages	 should	 only	 be	 awarded	 to	compensate	for	the	mental	distress	sustained	by	a	claimant	as	a	result	of	the	defendant’s	conduct	and	should	not	include	a	punitive	element.67	This	recommendation	is	now	substantiated	by	the	
																																																													56	Rookes	(n	13)	1228	(Lord	Devlin).	57	John	(n	1)	587.	In	the	last	50	years,	the	law	concerning	the	award	of	exemplary	damages	has	been	considered	in	three	cases	by	the	House	of	Lords,	i.e.	Rookes	(n	13),	Broome	(n	16),	Kuddus	v	Chief	
Constable	of	Leicestershire	Constabulary	[2002]	2	AC	122,	and	in	one	case	in	the	Supreme	Court,	i.e.	R	
(Lumba)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Home	Department	[2011]	2	WLR	671.	Their	facts	are	not	relevant	for	present	purposes.	58	John	(n	1)	607	(Sir	Thomas	Bingham	MR).	See,	however,	in	Broome	(n	16)	1086	Lord	Reid’s	position	on	the	‘highly	anomalous’	punitive	practice	of	awarding	exemplary	damages	in	civil	proceedings	without	clear	legal	basis	for	doing	so.	59	Broome	(n	16)	1073	(Lord	Hailsham).	60	Varuhas	(n	5)	290.	61	Crime	and	Courts	Act	2013,	s	34(6).	62	Ibid	s	34(2).	63	Johnson	v	Steele	and	Ors	[2014]	EWHC	B24,	[12]	(Eady	J).	64	The	Right	Honourable	Lord	Justice	Leveson,	An	Inquiry	into	the	Culture,	Practices	and	Ethics	of	the	Press,	Volume	IV	(The	Stationary	Office	2012)	1510.	65	For	the	relationship	between	aggravated	damages	and	other	types	of	damages,	see	Gatley	(n	1)	9.21	and	Mark	Lunney,	Donal	Nolan	and	Ken	Oliphant,	Tort	Law	(6th	ed,	OUP	2017)	891	who	draw	attention	to	the	overlap	between	aggravated	and	exemplary	damages.	66	Johnson	(n	63).	67	Law	Commission,	Aggravated,	Exemplary	and	Restitutionary	Damages	(Law	Com	No	247,	1997)	183.	
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Crime	and	Courts	Act	2013.68	Being	conceptually	separated	from	exemplary	damages,	by	both	their	name	and	the	pre-conditions	of	availability,	aggravated	damages	appear	to	incorporate	a	modest	vindicatory	quality	 to	 the	extent	 that	 they	recognise	 the	 inescapable	 link	between	the	defendant’s	 contumelious	motive	or	otherwise	offensive	conduct	and	 the	heightened	sense	of	injury	and	grievance	caused	to	the	claimant	and	his	self-esteem.	The	classic	exposition	of	the	definition	of	nominal	damages	is	found	in	The	Mediana,	where	Lord	Halsbury	LC	stated:	‘Nominal	damages’	is	a	technical	phrase	which	means	that	you	have	negatived	anything	like	real	damage,	but	that	you	are	affirming	by	your	nominal	damages	that	there	is	an	infraction	of	a	legal	right	which,	though	it	gives	you	no	right	to	any	real	damages	at	all,	yet	gives	you	a	right	to	the	verdict	or	judgment	because	your	legal	right	has	been	infringed.69	Awards	 of	 this	 kind	 usually	 comprise	 a	 small	 amount	 (£20	 or	 less)	 and	 as	 such,	 it	would	 be	difficult	 to	 envisage	 that	 they	 are	 capable	 of	 serving	 as	 the	 best	 vehicle	 for	 reminding	 those	interested	 that	 the	 libellous	 allegations	 complained	 of	 were	 without	 foundation.	 They	 are,	however,	 seen	 as	 marking	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 right	 to	 reputation	 and	 its	 violation	 by	 the	wrongdoer.70	Hence,	they	may	be	regarded	as	performing	a	relatively	limited	vindicatory	function	through	their	expressive	capacity	to	determine	the	scope	and	reinforce	the	inherent	value	of	the	claimant’s	protected	interests.		Historically,	nominal	damages	were	regarded	as	‘a	mere	peg	on	which	to	hang	costs’.71	The	rule	of	awarding	costs	in	favour	of	the	successful	party	denoted	the	rather	deterministic	notion	that	an	award	of	even	token	damages	in	favour	of	that	party	represented	the	formal	recognition	of	their	success	with	respect	to	the	application	of	the	law	at	issue.	However,	a	review	of	more	recent	authorities	shows	that	a	party	obtaining	an	award	of	nominal	damages	will	not	necessarily	be	regarded	as	a	successful	party72	in	light	of	the	courts’	powers	and	practice	on	costs.73	Sound	policy	reasons	may	justify	to	an	extent	this	position:	a	general	rule	that	nominal	awards	will	normally	carry	a	costs	order	in	the	claimant’s	favour	may	not	be	particularly	welcome,	because	the	lure	of	procuring	costs	may	create	a	potential	risk	of	unwarranted	and	opportunistic	litigation.	Awards	of	a	token	sum	are	sometimes	referred	to	as	‘contemptuous	damages’.74	In	the	words	of	Lord	Esher	MR	in	Whittaker,	these	are	typically	awarded	‘[…]	if	a	libel	were	a	trivial	or	ridiculous	one,	in	respect	of	which	the	jury	thought	that	an	action	ought	not	to	have	been	brought’.75	In	these	situations,	although	a	court	may	find	that	a	claimant’s	interests	have	been	unlawfully	breached,	it	may	refuse	to	exercise	its	discretion	(from	the	damages	being	at	large)	in	his	or	her	favour	and	award	 the	 coin	 of	 the	 lowest	 denomination	 in	 current	 circulation	 (1p).	 This	 implies	 a	 sharp	criticism	and	conveys	the	message	that	very	little	sympathy	with	the	claimant	is	warranted.	It	is																																																														68	Crime	and	Courts	Act	2013,	s	39.	69	Owners	of	the	Steamship	Mediana	v	Owners	of	the	Lightship	Comet	Mediana	[1900]	AC	113,	116.	70	Lord	Scott,	‘Damages’	(2007)	4	Lloyd’s	Maritime	and	Commercial	Law	Quarterly	465,	469;	James	Edelman,	Jason	Varuhas	and	Simon	Colton	(eds),	McGregor	on	Damages	(20th	ed,	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2017)	12-011;	Varuhas	(n	5)	275,	292.	71	Beaumont	v	Greathead	(1846)	2	CB	494,	499	(Maule	J).	72	Hyde	Park	Residence	Ltd	v	Yelland	and	Ors	[1999]	EMLR	654,	672	(Jacob	J);	Anglo	Cyprian	Trade	
Agencies	v	Paphos	Wine	Industries	[1951]	1	All	ER	873.	73	Senior	Courts	Act	1981,	s	51	and	CPR	44.2(1),	discussed	later.	74	Baily	v	Truth	and	Sportsman	Ltd	(1938)	60	CLR	700,	708	(Latham	CJ),	728	(McTiernan	J).	75	Whittaker	v	Scarborough	Post	Newspaper	Co	[1896]	2	QB	148,	149.	
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therefore	only	rarely	possible	that	such	damages	can	achieve	any	sensible	degree	of	vindication.	The	 old	 authorities	 of	 Newstead76	 and	 Pamplin,77	 where	 one	 farthing	 (now	 0.1p)	 and	 one	halfpenny	 were	 awarded	 respectively,	 are	 notable	 examples	 in	 this	 regard.	 Contemptuous	damages	are	mainly	used	 in	defamation	actions	and	 the	 introduction	of	 the	new	 threshold	of	serious	harm	under	s	1	of	 the	Defamation	Act	2013,	which	aims	 to	discourage	unmeritorious	claims,	means	that	such	awards	are	 likely	to	become	scarcer.	Having	considered	this	essential	framework,	the	analysis	proceeds	to	examine	the	correlation	between	the	parties’	conduct	and	the	award,	focusing	in	particular	on	claimants	who	were	found	to	have	misconducted	themselves.	
The	importance	of	good	conduct:	the	winner	does	not	‘take	it	all’	The	size	of	a	libel	award	can	reflect	the	additional	injury	caused	to	a	claimant’s	feelings	by	the	defendant’s	acts	or	omissions	from	the	point	of	the	publication	complained	of	up	until	the	time	of	judgment,78	including	for	instance	their	refusal	to	acknowledge	the	falsity	of	the	claims	(up	to	the	closing	submissions),79	their	conduct	 in	contesting	the	action	before	and	at	the	trial,80	and	the	persistence	with	which	the	defamatory	allegations	were	advanced.81	For	their	part,	defendants	may	seek	to	reduce	the	amount	of	damages	from	what	might	otherwise	have	been	appropriate	by	invoking	 evidence	 of	 absence	 of	 malice,82	 evidence	 that	 the	 claimant	 has	 already	 recovered	damages	over	substantially	the	same	allegations83	and	that	they	made	(or	offered	to	make)	an	apology	 or	 offer	 of	 amends.	 A	 defence	 of	 partial	 justification	 (or	 truth)	 will	 not	 prevent	 the	claimant	from	succeeding	on	the	issue	of	liability,	but	it	can	be	important	with	regard	to	the	issue	of	 damages.	 The	 extent	 of	 the	 reduction	 depends	 on	 how	 close	 the	 defendant	 has	 come	 to	establishing	 the	 substantial	 truth	 of	 the	 allegation.84	 A	 reduced	 sum	may	 also	 be	 awarded,	 if	evidence	before	the	court	demonstrates	that	the	claimant’s	reputation	is	already	so	besmirched	that	the	words	complained	of	could	not	cause	any	further	injury.	In	light	of	the	serious	harm	requirement	under	the	2013	Act,	the	claimant’s	reputation	will	be	‘very	much	 in	play	 from	 the	outset.’85	This	 requirement	was	enacted	 in	 a	 legal	 context	which	recognised	the	principle	of	‘a	real	and	substantial	tort’	established	in	Jameel86	and	a	threshold	of	seriousness	 –	 phrased	 in	 terms	 of	 substantiality	 -	 expounded	 in	 Thornton.87	 Building	 on	 the	consideration	 given	 by	 the	 courts	 in	 these	 previous	 authorities	 to	 the	 question	 of	 what	 is	sufficient	to	establish	that	a	statement	is	defamatory,	Parliament	intended	to	‘raise	the	bar’88	by	
																																																													76	Newstead	v	London	Express	Newspapers	[1940]	1	KB	377	(CA).	77	Pamplin	v	Express	Newspapers	Ltd	(No	2)	[1988]	1	WLR	116	(CA).	78	John	(n	1)	607-608	(Sir	Thomas	Bingham	MR).	79	Cruddas	v	Adams	(n	19)	[41]	(Eady	J).	80	See	Cruddas	v	Calvert	(n	18)	[301]	–	[303],	in	which	the	cross-examination	of	the	claimant	and	the	defendant’s	conduct	were	found	by	the	court	to	be	‘offensive’	to	him.	81	Rahman	(n	18)	[106]	(Eady	J);	Woodward	(n	18).	82	Pearson	v	Lemaitre	(1843)	5	M	&	G	700,	719	(Tindal	CJ).	83	Defamation	Act	1952,	s	12.	84	Pamplin	(n	77)	120	(Neill	LJ).	85	Clerk	and	Lindsell	on	Torts	(n	19)	22-239.	86	Jameel	v	Dow	Jones	&	Co	[2005]	EWCA	Civ	75,	[70]	(Phillips	LJ).	87	Thornton	v	Telegraph	Media	Group	Ltd	[2010]	EWHC	1414,	[86]	(Tugendhat	J).	88	Explanatory	Notes	to	the	Defamation	Act	2013,	para	11.	
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introducing	a	 ‘stricter	 test’89	 for	bringing	a	defamation	claim,	 so	 that	 trifling	and	undeserving	claims	are	not	permitted	to	proceed.90	Although	it	is	not	entirely	clear	how	much	higher	the	bar	is	raised,	 the	change	from	substantiality	to	seriousness	did	not	mean,	according	to	Davis	LJ	 in	
Lachaux,	 that	 ‘the	 labours	 of	 Parliament	 have	 produced	 a	 mouse’:91	 ‘On	 the	 contrary,	 […]	Parliament	has	in	effect	given	statutory	status	to	the	decision	in	Thornton	whilst	at	the	same	time	raising	the	threshold	from	one	of	substantiality	to	one	of	seriousness’.92	‘Serious’	in	s	1	of	the	Act,	Davis	 LJ	 observed,	 conveys	 something	 ‘rather	 more	 weighty’93	 than	 ‘substantial’,	 arguably	corresponding	 to	 a	 ‘Thornton	 Plus’	 standard.94	 The	 common	 law	 presumption	 of	 damage	 is	compatible	with	 s	 1	 and	has	 not	 been	 affected	 by	 the	Defamation	Act	 2013.	 But,	 ‘there	 is	 no	presumption	at	law	of	serious	damage	in	a	libel	case’.	95	Accordingly,	this	must	be	proved,	usually	by	 an	 inferential	 case	 where	 an	 allegation	 has	 a	 serious	 defamatory	 meaning.96	 Once	 this	threshold	is	crossed,	further	evidence	will	be	material	to	the	quantum	of	damage,	if	 liability	is	established.	The	 quantum	 of	 injury	 sustained	 reflects	 the	 principle	 that	 a	 claimant	 with	 an	 unsullied	reputation	is	likely	to	suffer	greater	harm	than	a	claimant	of	considerable	notoriety.97	The	1882	case	of	Scott	v	Sampson	established	that	defendants	are	permitted	to	rely	on	general	evidence	of	the	claimant’s	ill-repute	but	specific	acts	of	unrelated	unsavoury	misconduct	which	do	not	form	part	of	a	substantive	defence,	like	truth,	cannot	be	advanced	in	mitigation.98	The	law	distinguishes	between	a	claimant’s	actual	reputation	and	instances	in	his	or	her	life	which	ought	to	determine	his	or	her	reputation.99	It	follows	that	damages	cannot	be	reduced	by	demonstrating,	for	example,	that	a	claimant	would	have	a	bad	reputation,	if	his	past	conduct	was	known.100	Introducing	such	evidence	could	result	in	endless	disputes	and	a	disproportionate	increase	in	costs.	However,	the	courts	have	expressly	sanctioned	a	deviation	from	this	rule	in	respect	of	‘the	raw	material	upon	which	bad	reputation	is	built	up’,101	i.e.	criminal	convictions,	provided	that	they	are	relevant	to	the	words	 complained	of	 and	not	 temporally	distant	 (in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	have	 taken	place	within	a	relevant	period	so	as	to	affect	a	claimant’s	current	reputation).102																																																														89	Joint	Committee	on	the	Draft	Defamation	Bill,	Draft	Defamation	Bill	(2010-12,	HL	203,	HC	930-I)	[62];	Ministry	of	Justice,	The	Government’s	Response	to	the	Report	of	the	Joint	Committee	on	the	Draft	
Defamation	Bill	(Cm	8295,	2012)	paras	8-10.	90	Lachaux	(n	14)	[43].	91	Ibid	[78].	92	Ibid.	93	Ibid	[44]	(emphasis	in	the	original).	94	At	the	time	of	writing	(November	2018),	the	Supreme	Court	is	considering	the	proper	construction	of	s	1(1)	of	the	2013	Act	and	the	extent	to	which	the	bar	has	been	raised	in	Lachaux	(Respondent)	v	
Independent	Print	Limited	and	Anr	(Appellants)	UKSC	2017/0175,	against	the	Court	of	Appeal	decision	of	Davis	LJ,	with	whom	MacFarlane	and	Sharp	LJJ	concurred,	[2017]	EWCA	Civ	1334.	95	Lachaux	(n	14)	[72]	and	[82].	96	Ibid.	97	Scott	(n	2)	503	(Cave	J);	Speidel	v	Plato	Films	Ltd	and	Ors	[1960]	3	WLR	391,	396	(Devlin	LJ).	98	Scott	(n	2).	99	Speidel	(n	97)	396	(Devlin	LJ).	100	Lord	Chancellor's	Department	(LCO	13/124),	Report	of	Committee	on	Defamation	(Cmnd	5909,	1975)	para	363;	Clerk	and	Lindsell	on	Torts	(n	19)	22-242.	101	Goody	v	Odhams	Press	Ltd	[1964]	1	QB	333,	340	(Lord	Denning	MR);	applied	in	King	v	Grundon	[2012]	EWHC	2719.		102	See,	for	example,	the	recent	case	of	Oyston	(n	18),	where	the	High	Court	assessed	damages	in	a	defamation	claim	brought	by	the	claimant	football	club,	its	chairman	and	its	owner	against	a	club	
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The	 boundaries	 between	 evidence	 of	 bad	 reputation	 and	 evidence	 of	 specific	 instances	 of	misbehaviour	 are	 not	 always	 sharply	 defined.	 Despite	 previous	 calls	 for	 its	 abolition,103	Parliament	chose	not	to	relax	the	Scott	principle,104	partly	on	the	grounds	of	a	potential	reverse	‘chilling	effect’,	 i.e.	that	claimants	would	be	deterred	from	pursuing	a	matter	for	fear	that	they	would	be	exposed	to	 further	 ‘muck-raking’	by	 the	media.105	Nevertheless,	 the	Court	of	Appeal	controversially	 ruled	 in	Burstein106	 that	 evidence	 of	 ‘directly	 relevant	 background	 context’	 is	admissible	to	be	considered	in	mitigation,	because	it	is	closely	pertinent	to	the	damage	which	has	allegedly	been	caused	by	the	defamatory	publication.	The	court’s	approach	appears	to	have	been	influenced	in	part	by	the	spirit	of	the	then	newly	introduced	Civil	Procedure	Rules,	which	require	the	court	to	‘deal	with	cases	justly’.107	The	parameters	of	the	Burstein	plea	were	clarified	to	some	extent	 later	 in	Turner,108	 in	which	Moses	LJ	held	 that,	 for	 the	purpose	of	mitigating	damages,	defendants’	 evidence	 should	be	 ‘directly	 relevant	 to	a	 claimant’s	 conduct	or	 reputation	 in	 the	particular	sector	to	which	the	defamatory	material	relates’.109	In	other	words,	the	farther	apart	from	the	defamatory	statement	the	subject	matter	of	the	proposed	Burstein	evidence	is,	the	less	likely	it	is	to	be	admitted.		The	fortification	of	the	Burstein	plea	in	Turner	creates	a	flexible	set	of	principles	that	have	the	potential	 to	 shield	 a	 claimant	 from	 unreasonable	 and	 unwarranted	 attacks	 to	 his	 or	 her	reputation.	It	appears,	however,	that	Turner	calibrates	the	scales	in	favour	of	the	defendant	and	leaves	the	claimant’s	interests	dependent	on	the	courts’	overall	discretion	to	determine	on	a	case-by-case	basis	the	degree	to	which	evidence	of	the	claimant’s	general	reputation	is	connected	to	the	subject	matter	of	the	defamatory	statement.	This	may	be	justifiable	to	the	extent	that	the	court	has	a	 strong	 interest	 in	enabling	 the	most	 clear-sighted	and	unblinkered	consideration	of	 the	claimant	in	its	efforts	to	establish	the	blemishing	impact	of	a	libel.		The	claimant’s	acts	or	omissions	at	the	time	of	publication	are	material	too.110	Libels	which	were	published	by	the	claimant	and	provoked	the	defamatory	statement	for	which	redress	is	claimed	can	mitigate	damages.111	 In	Godfrey,	 the	defendant,	 an	 Internet	Service	Provider,	was	granted	leave	 to	 amend	 its	 defence	 to	 include	 evidence	 of	 newsgroup	 postings	made	 by	 the	 claimant	which	 were	 found	 by	 the	 court	 to	 be	 ‘puerile,	 unseemly	 and	 provocative’112	 and	 ‘causally	
																																																													supporter,	who	had	made	several	postings	on	Internet	websites	containing	allegations	of	a	sexual	nature	against	them	and	falsely	alleging	corrupt	behaviour.	The	club’s	owner	had	been	convicted	of	a	rape	and	indecent	assault	in	1996.	The	judge	noted	that	the	defendant	was	not	prohibited	from	making	a	reference	to	this	aspect	of	the	claimant’s	personal	past	and	that	damages	had	to	be	reduced	because	of	the	claimant’s	general	bad	reputation	in	relation	to	his	sexual	conduct.	103	Report	of	Committee	on	Defamation	(n	100);	Gwyneth	Pitt,	‘Report	of	the	Committee	on	Defamation’	(1976)	39(2)	MLR	187.	104	Turner	v	News	Group	Newspapers	Ltd	and	Anr	[2006]	EWCA	Civ	540,	[38]	–	[40].	105	Richard	Caddell,	‘Directly	relevant	background	context’	and	defamation	damages’	(2006)	65(3)	CambLJ	493,	495.	106	Burstein	v	Times	Newspapers	Ltd	[2001]	1	WLR	579.	107	CPR	1.1.	108	Turner	(n	104).	109	Ibid	[89];	see	also	Keene	LJ’s	less	simple	construction	in	[56].	110	Dingle	(n	32)	395	(Lord	Radcliffe).	111	Watts	v	Fraser	and	Anr	(1835)	174	ER	154,	155	(Lord	Denman	CJ);	Kelly	v	Sherlock	[1866]	LR	1	QB	686,	698	(Blackburn	J);	Broome	(n	16)	1071	(Lord	Hailsham	LC).	112	Godfrey	v	Demon	Internet	Ltd	[1999]	EWH	240,	[15]	(Morland	J).	
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connected’113	to	the	libel	complained	of.	Moreover,	in	Gorman,	which	concerned	a	libel	contained	in	a	mock	press	release,	the	Court	of	Appeal	reduced	a	jury	award	of	£150,000	to	£50,000	partly	because	of	the	role	played	by	the	claimant	herself	in	a	long-standing	‘bitter	dispute’	which	had	developed	between	‘two	strong-minded	individuals	who	were	capable	of	expressing	themselves	with	 vigour’.114	 In	 Trumm,	 where	 a	 train	 driver	 sought	 damages	 in	 relation	 to	 defamatory	statements	published	about	him	by	the	general	secretary	of	the	driver’s	trade	union,	Tugendhat	J	halved	the	claimant’s	damages	on	the	basis	that	he	had	initiated	himself	a	‘slanging	match’.115	The	 tone	 of	 his	 preceding	website	 postings	 was	 ‘unnecessarily	 provocative	 and	 offensive,’116	thereby	triggering	the	publication	of	the	allegations	complained	of.	Claimants	may	also	find	their	damages	affected	by	their	position	in	relation	to	the	resolution	of	the	dispute.	In	Campbell	v	News	Group	Newspapers	Ltd	(No	2),117	the	Court	of	Appeal	allowed	the	appeal	against	a	jury	award	over	a	News	of	the	World	article	which	alleged	that	the	claimant	was	an	active	paedophile.	It	was	found	that	there	was	partial,	yet	significant,	justification	in	the	form	of	 ‘a	 highly	perverted	 interest	 in	boys’118	 and	 that	 the	 claimant	had	dishonestly	 attempted	 to	improve	 the	outcome	of	 the	 litigation	 itself.	He	had	procured	 false	 testimony,	made	 ‘the	most	damaging’119	allegations	of	corruption	and	lying	against	the	defendant’s	lawyers,	and	attacked	the	credibility	 of	 an	 innocent	 third	 party.	 Although	 the	 court	 accepted	 that	 the	 ‘very	 serious’120	defamatory	 statements	 in	 the	 appellants’	 publication	 could	not	be	 fully	 justified,	 it	 felt	 that	 it	would	 have	 been	 an	 ‘affront	 to	 justice’,121	 had	 the	 claimant’s	 own	 disreputable	 conduct	 been	ignored	in	assessing	damages.	Consequently,	it	heavily	reduced	the	original	award	from	£350,000	to	£30,000	to	reflect	the	fact	that	the	claimant	had	engaged	in	‘the	grossest	misconduct’122	up	to	and	during	the	trial.		It	appears	therefore	that	the	claimants’	behaviour	in	the	past	and	conduct	of	their	case	at	trial	emerge	 as	weighty	 factors	 in	 assessing	 the	 appropriate	 amount	of	 damages.	Notwithstanding	their	success	on	liability,	claimants’	conduct	can	also	lead	to	a	dramatic	reduction	of	an	award,	even	to	the	tune	of	a	nominal	£1,	which	is	occasionally	accompanied	by	negative	costs	orders.123	Recent	illustrations	of	the	interplay	between	the	claimant’s	misconduct	and	the	resultant	nominal	damages	in	the	context	of	libel	raise	questions	about	the	extent	to	which	claimants	who	recovered	negligible	 awards	 can	 properly	 be	 regarded	 as	 successful	 and	 vindicated	 litigants.	 Joseph	 v	
Spiller124	and	FlyMeNow	v	Quick	Air	 Jet125	are	particularly	noteworthy	cases	 in	 this	 regard.	An	interesting	but	comparatively	disregarded	aspect	of	both	judgments	is	the	consideration	of	the	vindicatory	aspects	of	the	awards	made.	FlyMeNow	also	provides	the	opportunity	to	explore	the																																																														113	Ibid	[20]	(Morland	J).	114	Gorman	v	Mudd	(CA,	15	October	1992)	(see	Russell	LJ	and	Neill	LJ	in	particular).	115	Trumm	v	Norman	[2008]	EWHC	116,	[53]	(Tugendhat	J).	116	Ibid	[52].	117	[2002]	EWCA	Civ	1143.	118	Ibid	[31].	119	Ibid	[119].	120	Ibid	[21].	121	Ibid	[33].	122	Ibid	[115].	123	Senior	Courts	Act	1981,	s	51	and	CPR	44.2(1).	124	Craig	Joseph,	Jason	Joseph	&	Anthony	Raymond	v	Jason	Spiller	&	1311	Events	Ltd	[2012]	EWHC	2958	(26	October	2012).	125	FlyMeNow	Ltd	v	Quick	Air	Jet	GmbH	[2016]	EWHC	3197.	
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issues	considered	in	this	article	from	the	corporate	claimants’	angle.	Bodies	trading	for	profit	are	required	under	s	1(2)	of	the	Defamation	2013	Act	to	demonstrate	that	an	imputation	has	caused	or	is	likely	to	cause	them	‘serious	financial	loss’	in	order	to	meet	the	serious	harm	requirement.	For	 instance,	a	 loss	of	 the	ability	 to	attract	custom	and	generate	revenue	could	be	persuasive	evidence	of	the	adverse	financial	effects	of	the	poisonous	allegations.126	The	date	of	the	contested	publication	in	FlyMeNow,	i.e.	5	December	2013,	meant	that	the	new	Act,	which	came	into	force	in	January	2014,	did	not	apply.	However,	when	viewed	through	the	lens	of	the	higher,	‘serious	harm’	and	 ‘serious	 financial	 loss’	 thresholds	 in	 the	 post-Defamation	 Act	 2013	 libel	 landscape,	 the	concern	arising	from	the	possibility	of	judicial	censure	through	nominal	damages	is	considerably	accentuated.	 It	 seems	 well	 arguable	 that	 the	 need	 for	 the	 unfavourable	 allegation	 to	 be	contradicted	in	the	public	mind	through	a	demonstrable	mark	of	the	wrong	done	becomes	more	pressing	and	the	remedial	role	of	vindication	as	a	‘check	on	the	award’	even	more	pronounced.	The	case	in	Joseph	was	brought	by	the	three	members	of	a	Motown	tribute	band,	known	as	The	
Gillettes,	against	an	entertainment	agency	and	its	director,	Mr	Spiller,	who	secured	work	for	them.	The	underlying	business	dispute,	which	was	branded	by	Lord	Philipps	as	a	‘considerable	storm	in	 a	 teacup’,127	 emerged	 over	 a	 critical	 notice	which	 the	 defendants	 posted	 on	 their	website,	questioning	the	band’s	trustworthiness	and	ability	to	abide	by	their	contractual	obligations.	The	case	 presents	 a	 rather	 long	 and	 complex	 litigation	 history.	 Before	 trial,	 the	 defendants	successfully	argued	for	the	reinstatement	of	their	defence	of	fair	comment	before	the	Supreme	Court.128	 At	 trial,	 although	 the	 claimants	 succeeded	 on	 the	 merits,	 Tugendhat	 J	 found	 that,	following	the	publication	of	the	words	complained	of,	the	first	claimant,	Craig	Joseph,	carried	on	‘a	 sophisticated	 deception’129	 of	 the	 court	 by	 deliberately	 advancing	 a	 false	 claim	 for	 special	damages.	 It	 was	 accepted,	 in	 particular,	 that	 he	 misled	 the	 court	 and	 abused	 its	 process	 by	knowingly	putting	forward,	and	relying	on,	a	fabricated	document	in	support	of	part	of	his	claim	for	 damages	 resulting	 from	 the	 cancellation	 of	 two	 bookings.130	 The	 ‘dishonest	 and	untrustworthy’131	 conduct	 of	 Mr	 Joseph	 in	 deceiving	 the	 court	 throughout	 the	 proceedings,	including	at	trial,	was	deemed	so	serious	that	he	could	not	be	awarded	any	substantial	damages.	The	musician	eventually	recovered	only	‘nominal’132	damages,	in	the	sum	of	£0.01.	Although	there	was	no	suggestion	that	the	second	and	third	claimants	had	been	‘dishonest’,133	they	were	jointly	known	as	The	Gillettes	and	their	reputations	were	intimately	linked	to	that	of	the	first	claimant,	
																																																													126	The	loss	of	one	client	for	a	small	law	firm	with	high	value	instructions	has	been	held	in	Brett	Wilson	
LLP	v	Person(s)	Unknown	[2015]	EWHC	2628	to	show	a	likelihood	of	serious	financial	loss,	but	what	constitutes	such	a	loss	for	a	small	privately-owned	company	is	likely	to	be	assessed	differently	in	relation	to	a	large	public	limited	company.	127	Spiller	and	Anr	v	Joseph	and	Ors	[2010]	UKSC	53	(appeal	from	Joseph	and	Ors	v	Spiller	and	Anr	[2009]	EWCA	Civ	1075).	128	This	was	the	first	libel	case	considered	by	the	UK	Supreme	Court	since	its	inception.	The	court	was	primarily	concerned	with	the	extent	to	which,	if	at	all,	the	common	law	defence	of	fair	comment	requires	that	the	comment	identifies	the	matter	to	which	it	relates.	The	test	applied	by	Lord	Nicholls	that	‘the	comment	must	explicitly	or	implicitly	indicate,	at	least	in	general	terms,	the	facts	on	which	it	is	based’	is	now	reflected	in	s	3(3)	of	the	Defamation	Act	2013.	129	Joseph	(n	124)	[155].	130	Ibid	[177].	131	Ibid	[166].	132	Ibid	[184].	133	Ibid	[181].	
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who	was	acting	on	their	behalf.	As	such,	the	remaining	members	of	the	musical	act	had	to	rely	on	the	reasons	for	judgment	as	sufficient	vindication	of	their	reputation.	In	FlyMeNow,	an	aircraft	charter	company	registered	in	England	claimed	damages	for	libel	against	a	German	aviation	company	which	provides	private	jets.	The	parties	entered	a	contract	for	the	provision	of	two	air	ambulance	flights	in	July	and	August	2013.	Both	went	on,	but	debts	accrued	due	to	the	claimant’s	failure	to	make	full	payments	of	the	charter	fees	before	the	flights.	Whilst	there	 were	 still	 outstanding	 payments,	 and	 after	 several	 attempts	 to	 collect	 them	 from	 the	claimant	in	relation	to	these	flights,	the	defendant	circulated	in	December	of	the	same	year	an	email	to	the	generic	email	addresses	of	26	companies	in	the	aviation	industry.	The	email	was	sent	internationally	 but	 the	 claim	 related	 only	 to	 the	 publication	 within	 England	 and	Wales.	 The	message	was	headed	‘WARNING:	Company	you	should	not	deal	with!	Pecuniary	difficulties!’;	its	body	stated	that	the	claimant,	who	was	clearly	identified	by	their	company	name,	address	and	website	details,	was	a	‘defaulting	debtor’134	and	was	‘obviously	incapable	to	pay	their	outstanding	amounts	 in	 total’.135	 The	 natural	 and	 ordinary	meaning	 of	 the	words	 complained	 of	went,	 in	Warby	J’s	view,	so	far	as	to	suggest	that	FlyMeNow	was	insolvent.	On	the	evidence,	it	was	‘very	largely’136	true	that	it	would	be	financially	unsafe	for	any	industry	party	to	engage	in	business	with	FlyMeNow,	but	it	was	held	that	the	defence	of	justification	was	not	made	out.	The	claimant’s	plea	of	malice	failed	but	so	did	the	defence	of	qualified	privilege.	The	alternative	defence	of	abuse	of	 process	was	 not	 established	 either.	 Accordingly,	 the	 claimant	was	 entitled	 to	 judgment	 on	liability.		Despite	the	above,	it	was	decided	that	FlyMeNow	was	entitled	to	an	award	of	minimal	damages	to	the	tune	of	£10.137	Scathing	criticism	of	the	claimant’s	attitudes	in	advancing	their	case	and	pursuing	their	claims	permeated	Warby	J’s	judgment.	The	claimant’s	case	was	found	‘confused	and	confusing’138	and	their	position	on	payment	terms	vague	and	inconsistent.139	Moreover,	the	claimant’s	bank	balances	showed	that,	although	the	amounts	deposited	were	at	times	sufficient	to	discharge	their	contractual	payment	obligations	towards	the	defendant,	money	was	paid	out	to	unrelated	third	parties,	whose	demands	were	prioritised.	As	Warby	J	put	it,	‘the	claimant	was	“robbing	Peter	to	pay	Paul”.140	He	made	plain	his	severe	disapproval	of	the	claimant’s	‘delaying	[payment]	tactics’.141	These	seemingly	resulted	from	their	rigid	determination	to	follow	internal	policies	 which	 were	 aimed	 at	 hedging	 exchange-rate	 risk	 but	 were	 inconsistent	 with	 any	contractual	rights.	In	the	judge’s	view,	the	claimant	behaved	‘dishonestly’142	in	implementing	such	an	 approach.	 They	 repeatedly	 attempted	 to	 appease	 the	 defendant	 with	 lies143	 and	 constant	promises	 of	 payment	 which	 were	 broken.144	 The	 witness	 for	 the	 claimant,	 a	 director	 of	 the	
																																																													134	FlyMeNow	(n	125)	[65].	135	Ibid	[55].	136	FlyMeNow	(n	125)	[132].	137	Ibid	[130].	138	Ibid	[74].	139	Ibid	[75]	–	[76].	140	Ibid	[67].	141	Ibid	[96].	142	Ibid	[94].	143	Ibid	[127].	144	Ibid	[54].	
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company	and	its	sole	shareholder,	was	also	found	by	Warby	J	to	be	unsatisfactory	and	‘willing	to	bend	the	truth’.145	The	judge	was	also	evidently	unimpressed	by	his	demeanour	at	trial.146	The	evidence	therefore	revealed	disreputable	conduct	which	was	of	a	different	nature	from	that	which	 the	 defamatory	 imputation	 conveyed.	 However,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 partial	 justification	established	 by	 the	 defendant	 in	 their	 attempt	 to	 prove	 insolvency,	 it	 was	 felt	 that	 the	 ‘right	approach’147	was	 to	compensate	FlyMeNow	as	a	company	which	had	 ‘disgracefully’148	delayed	honouring	its	debts	for	several	months	with	‘a	series	of	dishonest	excuses’149	and	was	teetering	close	to	insolvency,	but	-	and	here	one	might	suggest	that	we	encounter	a	significantly	sized	but	-	was	not	insolvent.	In	addition,	these	facts	were	deemed	directly	relevant	to	the	context	in	which	the	defamatory	statement	was	made150	and	suggested	that	the	claimant	was	undeserving	of	a	sum	which	would	 appear	 to	 the	 outside	world	 to	 represent	 substantial	 vindication	of	 its	 business	reputation.151	All	these	factors	had	the	effect	of	considerably	reducing	what	would	otherwise	have	been	an	award	of	general	damages	in	the	modest	five	figure	range.152		The	conclusions	in	Joseph	and	FlyMeNow	present	some	similarities	with	the	older	case	of	the	well-known	premiership	goalkeeper,	Bruce	Grobbelaar,	who	was	ultimately	awarded	the	derisory	sum	of	£1	and	ordered	to	pay	 the	defendant’s	costs,	even	though	he	succeeded	 in	his	claim	over	a	series	of	reports	in	the	Sun	newspaper	alleging	that	he	had	accepted	bribes	to	let	in	goals	on	the	pitch.153	The	House	of	Lords	reinstated	the	jury’s	verdict	on	liability	in	favour	of	the	ex-footballer,	but	in	recognition	of	the	unquestionable	fact	that	he	had	systematically	conspired	to	attempt	to	fix	matches	in	return	for	bribes,	it	held	that	it	would	have	been	an	‘affront	to	sport,	public	justice	and	public	policy,’154	 if	a	court	of	 law	had	awarded	substantial	damages	to	a	man	who	had	so	flagrantly	breached	his	legal	and	moral	obligations.155	The	claimant	was	shown	to	have	behaved	in	a	way	which	any	right-thinking	person	would	have	unequivocally	condemned.	His	dishonest	bargains	disentitled	him	to	substantial	libel	damages	on	the	basis	that	the	value	of	his	reputation	was	 diminished	 by	 his	 own	 conduct.156	 Grobbelaar	 is	 often	 cited	 as	 an	 example	 whereby	contemptuous	damages	were	awarded.	Interestingly,	however,	nowhere	in	the	House	of	Lords	judgment	 is	 this	 term	 employed.	 Instead,	 the	 terms	 ‘nominal’157	 and	 ‘derisory’158	 are	 used	interchangeably	throughout	(though	the	latter	in	much	less	frequency)	without	a	firm	distinction	in	application.	Nevertheless,	the	divergence	in	terminology	in	this	case	did	not	actually	reflect	any	fundamental	 differences	 of	 approach.	Hence,	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that	 these	were	 in	 effect	 nominal	damages.159																																																														145	Ibid	[91].	146	Ibid	[86].	147	Ibid	[110].	148	Ibid	[127].	149	Ibid.	150	Burstein	(n	106);	Turner	(n	104)	[56].	151	FlyMeNow	(n	125)	[127].	152	Ibid.	153	Grobbelaar	(n	9).	154	Ibid	[36]	(Lord	Steyn).	155	Ibid	[24]	(Lord	Bingham	of	Cornhill).	156	Ibid.	157	Ibid	[27]	(Lord	Bingham),	[69]	(Lord	Millett).	158	Ibid	[28]	(Lord	Steyn),	[61]	(Lord	Hobhouse	of	Woodborough),	[69]	(Lord	Millett),	[87]	(Lord	Scott).	159	McGregor	on	Damages	(n	70)	12-009.	
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article that will be published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal 
of Media Law and it will be available at the following permanent link: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2019.1574468.  
Page	18	of	26		
A	different	path	forged	for	libel	Libel	courts’	approach	in	relation	to	decreasing	the	award	of	claimants	who	have	misconducted	themselves	 can	 be	 contrasted	 with	 that	 adopted	 by	 the	 courts	 in	 other	 tortious	 actions.	 In	
Fairclough	 Homes	 Ltd	 v	 Summers,160	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 recently	 considered	 the	 question	 of	whether	a	claimant	who	dishonestly	exaggerated	on	a	 large	scale	an	otherwise	valid	personal	injury	claim	should	lose	his	right	to	damages.	The	court	accepted	that	there	was	jurisdiction	to	strike	out	 such	a	 claim,161	 at	 any	 stage	of	 the	proceedings,	 even	after	 a	proper	 assessment	of	liability	and	quantum	had	been	made.162	However,	this	draconian	step	should	only	be	taken	as	a	last	resort	in	‘very	exceptional’163	circumstances,	where	it	is	just	and	proportionate	to	strike	out	an	action	after	trial,	e.g.	where	there	has	been	‘a	massive	attempt	to	deceive	the	court	but	the	award	of	damages	would	be	very	small’.164	In	the	ordinary	way,	the	court	added,	a	judge	would	be	 expected	 to	 penalise	 the	 dishonest	 and	 fraudulent	 claimant	 in	 costs.165	 Although	 this	 test	provides	 little	clarity	as	 to	 the	circumstances	under	which	this	power	might	be	exercised,	 the	consequence	 in	 Summers	 was	 that	 the	 claimant’s	 misconduct	 did	 not	 lead	 to	 a	 reduction	 in	damages.	Quite	the	contrary,	the	claimant	was	held	to	be	entitled	to	the	award	originally	assessed	by	 the	 judge.	 It	has	been	also	held	 that	defamation	 is	an	assault	on	reputation	analogous	 to	a	physical	assault	on	the	person.166	With	this	thought	in	mind,	the	Court	of	Appeal	authority	in	Lane	
v	Holloway	can	be	mobilised	to	support	the	proposition	that	a	claimant’s	questionable	conduct	cannot	reduce	the	real	damage	suffered	by	him	or	her.	It	was	concluded	that	the	turpitude	of	the	claimant’s	 conduct	 towards	 the	 defendant	 did	 not	 preclude	 the	 recovery	 of	 compensatory	damages	 claimed	 for	 assault	 (though	 this	 could	 prevent	 or	 reduce	 any	 award	 of	 exemplary	damages).	The	provocation	by	the	claimant	wiped	out	any	element	of	aggravation	but	it	did	not	reduce	the	real	damage	suffered	by	him.167		It	is	not	clear	what	might	account	for	the	different	approach	adopted	in	Joseph	and	FlyMeNow.	In	the	 former,	 the	proposition	 that	 the	 claimant	abused	 the	process	of	 the	 court	 justified,	 in	 the	opinion	of	 the	 court,	 nominal	 damages.	However,	 nominal	 damages	 are	 typically	 awarded,	 as	discussed	earlier,	where	a	claimant	succeeded	on	liability	but	failed	to	show	any	real	damage.	No	authority	was	cited	by	the	court	in	support	of	such	an	award	as	a	suitable	response	to	abusing	the	court’s	process.	 In	FlyMeNow,	Warby	 J	dismissed	 the	defendant’s	 argument	 that	 the	 claim	 for	damages	was	an	abuse.	The	company	had	not	deliberately	procured	a	defamatory	allegation	to	bring	 an	 action	 in	 relation	 to	 it.	 It	 rightfully	 brought	 a	 claim	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 probable	financial	 impact	of	any	reputational	harm	and	vindicate	 its	reputation	of	a	 false	 imputation	of																																																														160	Summers	(n	8).	161	The	court	also	has	the	power	under	CPR	3.4(2)	to	strike	out	a	claim	as	an	abuse	of	process,	i.e.	using	the	legal	procedure	‘for	a	purpose	or	in	a	way	which	is	significantly	different	from	its	ordinary	and	proper	use’;	see	Att	Gen	v	Paul	Evan	John	Barker	[2000]	1	FLR	759,	[19]	(Lord	Bingham	of	Cornhill).	162	An	example	of	proceedings	constituting	an	abuse	of	process	in	the	context	of	libel	could	include	frivolous	or	vexatious	defamation	proceedings	where	the	costs	of	the	litigation	would	be	disproportionate	to	the	benefit	accrued	by	a	claimant.	163	Summers	(n	8)	[61]	(Lord	Clarke).	164	Ibid	[49]	(Lord	Clarke).	165	Ibid	[53]	(Lord	Clarke).	166	Attorney-General	v	Newspaper	Publishing	Plc	and	Ors	[1988]	Ch	333,	371.	167	[1968]	1	QB	379.	For	an	interesting	example	from	a	different	common	law	jurisdiction,	see	Fontin	v	
Katapodis	[1962]	HCA	63,	in	which	the	High	Court	of	Australia	held	that	the	claimant’s	own	conduct	should	not	be	considered	where	damages	are	awarded	purely	by	way	of	compensation.	
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insolvency.	The	judge	found	that	the	allegation	of	insolvency,	which	was	the	sting	of	the	libel	in	this	case,	was	‘a	material	inaccuracy’168	and	the	defendants	failed	to	establish	that	insolvency	was	the	reason	why	they	had	not	been	paid.	FlyMeNow	could	have	paid	but	chose	not	to,	because	of	the	policies	they	had	adopted.	Moreover,	Warby	J	stressed	that	‘the	spreading	of	false	imputations	of	 insolvency	 is	 contrary	 to	 the	 public	 interest’169	 and	 underlined	 the	 ‘obvious	 dangers’170	 of	indiscriminate	 publication	 of	 credit	 information	 by	 those	 in	 business	 who	 have	 had	 bad	experiences	with	others.		It	is	perhaps	fanciful	to	suppose	that	Mr	Grobbelaar	had	a	reputation	that	was	capable	of	being	vindicated	in	the	proceedings.	In	his	case,	the	award	of	nominal	damages	was	made	because	he	had	no	reputation	capable	of	suffering	real	damage	by	reason	of	the	alleged	libel,	or	at	least	none	for	which	a	just	or	proportionate	compensation	could	be	provided.	In	Joseph	though,	it	was	not	suggested	that	the	claimants’	reputation	no	longer	deserved	legal	protection.	And	in	FlyMeNow,	it	was	not	suggested	that	the	claimant	company	had	no	reputation	which	could	be	marred	either.	
The	Gillettes’	reputation	was	actually	injured	by	‘serious	allegations’171	which	entitled	them	to	the	relief	sought.	In	a	similar	vein,	FlyMeNow	successfully	established	that	‘significant	reputational	harm	resulted	from	the	defendant’s	email,	and	no	doubt	that	was	reflected	in	financial	harm’.172	The	company’s	goodwill,	i.e.	its	ability	to	attract	custom,173	might	have	also	been	injured.174	The	finding	that	a	company	which	was	falsely	accused	of	being	insolvent	had	its	damages	reduced	to	a	derisory	level,	partly	because	it	had	unreasonably	delayed	payments	of	some	of	its	debts,	fits	somewhat	 uncomfortably	with	 pre-existing	 authority	 that	 the	 law	 has	 always	 taken	 a	 ‘grave	view’175	of	an	allegation	of	insolvency	in	a	business.	Thus,	in	light	of	the	injuries	inflicted	on	the	claimants’	standing	and	the	fact	that	neither	of	the	actions	in	Joseph	and	FlyMeNow	were	struck	out,	some	doubt	can	be	fairly	harboured	with	respect	to	the	courts’	decisions	to	deprive	claimants	of	suitable	compensatory	awards.	In	Fairclough,	the	Supreme	Court	refused	to	reduce	the	claimant’s	general	damages	notwithstanding	the	deliberate,	gross	and	dishonest	exaggeration	of	his	claim.	It	is	not,	therefore,	immediately	apparent	why	a	libel	court	can	reduce	a	dishonest	claimant’s	award,	especially	since	there	are	other	ways	with	which	 the	 courts	 can	 indicate	 their	 disapproval	 and	 disincentivise	 vexatious	 claimants	 (e.g.	penalising	a	party	in	costs).	This	variation	in	approach	may,	however,	be	explained	by	the	strong	nature	of	defamation	as	a	vindicatory,	 actionable	 per	 se	 tort,	 i.e.	 for	 which	 any	 infringement	 of	 protected	 interests	 is	automatically	wrongful.176	A	court’s	inquiry	in	such	cases	places	greater	emphasis	on	whether	the	claimant’s	 interests	have	been	interfered	with.	In	making	provision	for	a	substantive	damages	award	in	the	absence	of	factual	loss,	the	law	performs	an	overarching	vindicatory	role	‘dealing	
																																																													168	FlyMeNow	(n	125)	[132].	169	Ibid	[119].	170	Ibid.	171	Joseph	(n	124)	[169].	172	FlyMeNow	(n	125)	[126].	173	IRC	v	Muller	&	Co	Margarine	Ltd	[1901]	AC	217.	174	Lewis	v	Daily	Telegraph	[1964]	AC	234.	175	Kiam	v	Neil	(No	2)	[1996]	EMLR	493	(CA),	509	(Beldam	LJ).	176	Jameel	(n	42)	[91]	(Lord	Hoffman);	Jason	Varuhas,	‘A	Tort-Based	Approach	to	Damages	under	the	HRA	1998’	(2009)	72(5)	MLR	750,	766.	
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with	a	grievance,	affirming	respect	for	rights.’177	By	contrast,	a	personal	injury	claim,	which	was	the	subject-matter	in	Summers,	evinces	a	primary	focus	on	compensation	for	negligently	caused	factual	 harm.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 negligence	 does	 not	 offer	 legal	 protection	 to	 certain	interests,	 like	 physical	 well-being.	 This	 function	 is,	 however,	 indirectly	 served	 and	 does	 not	constitute	the	central	aim	of	the	tort,	which	is	to	ensure	compensation	for	the	losses	proximately	resulting	 from	 the	 defendant’s	 negligent	 actions.178	 Put	 differently,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 tort	 of	defamation,	negligence	is	more	defendant-	than	rights-holder-oriented,	with	the	courts’	relative	focus	being	 firmly	placed	on	 the	duties	 and	 responsibilities	 of	 the	defendant,	 rather	 than	 the	claimant’s	interests.179	Consequently,	it	may	be	thought	to	be	justifiable	in	an	action	for	libel	to	regard	the	interests	of	a	claimant	with	a	past	unsavoury	conduct,	including	the	conduct	of	their	case	at	trial,	as	less	deserving	of	damages	that	would	be	awarded	to	a	claimant	of	a	previously	unsullied	reputation.	From	this	perspective,	Joseph	and	FlyMeNow	are	important	decisions	also	because	they	demonstrate	the	adaptability	of	the	Burstein	and	Turner	principles	and	implicitly	cement	the	courts’	willingness	to	recognise	that	‘the	nature	of	reputation	is	irreparably	bound	up	with	moral	judgments	and	questions	of	what	is	relevant	to	reputation	cannot	really	be	decided	in	a	moral	vacuum’.180	It	appears	therefore	that	despite	a	finding	in	the	claimants’	favour,	their	perceived	misconduct	can	disentitle	them	from	receiving	a	wholly	undeserved	award	of	damages,	especially	where	their	discreditable	behaviour	constitutes	directly	relevant	background	evidence	or	where	they	have	behaved	dishonestly	and	disreputably	before	and	during	litigation.	The	conduct	of	 litigation	is	seen	as	irrelevant	to	the	issue	of	truth	and	in	judicial	minds,	the	vindication	of	their	reputation	had	been	given	in	the	reasons	for	their	judgments,	with	no	further	vindication	of	their	rights	being	deemed	necessary.	In	other	words,	claimants	were	obliged	to	feel	content	with	the	meagre	solace	that	could	be	derived	from	the	courts’	judgment	on	liability.	However,	the	recovery	of	nominal	damages	raises	questions	as	 to	whether	claimants	under	 those	circumstances	have	effectively	won	their	action	in	clearing	their	name,	and	crucially,	how	far	a	judge	sitting	alone	can	reduce	an	award	because	of	the	vindicatory	effect	of	their	carefully	reasoned	judgment.	Given	the	scarcity	of	jury	trials	in	libel	actions	in	the	post	2013	Act	climate,	this	matter	is	likely	to	arise	where	the	judge	who	 gives	 a	 judgment	 in	 the	 claimant’s	 favour	 also	 assesses	 the	damages.	 If	 tarnishing	someone’s	reputation	alters	others’	perception	of	that	person,	it	is	appropriate	to	also	consider	whether	 vindication	 can	 take	 a	 material	 form	 in	 an	 award	 of	 monetary	 damages	 and	 the	importance	of	 this	 issue	 for	 libel	 law,	with	 its	heavy	emphasis	on	 the	community’s	 interest	 in	knowing	the	truth	of	a	defamatory	charge.	
	 	
																																																													177	Tony	Weir,	A	Casebook	on	Tort	(10th	ed,	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2004)	7;	Varuhas	(n	5)	275.	178	Kenneth	Abraham,	The	Forms	and	Functions	of	Tort	Law	(4th	ed,	West	Academic	Press	2012)	241.	179	Varuhas	(n	176)	765-766.	180	Thomas	Gibbons,	‘Using	evidence	of	discreditable	behaviour	to	mitigate	libel	damages’	(2006)	11(2)	CommsL	60,	61.	For	a	discussion	on	the	links	of	reputation	to	moral	judgments	and	evaluations	of	the	behaviour	of	others,	see	Dan	Sperber	and	Nicolas	Baumard,	‘Moral	Reputation:	An	Evolutionary	and	Cognitive	Perspective’	(2012)	27(5)	Mind	and	Language	495.	
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Libel	 damages,	 vindication	 and	 the	 claimant’s	 perception	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	
others	The	function	of	damages	in	vindicating	a	claimant’s	reputation	was	well	explained	in	Broome	v	
Cassell.181	Where	damages	for	loss	of	reputation	are	involved,		not	merely	can	[a	claimant]	recover	the	estimated	sum	of	his	past	and	future	losses,	but,	in	case	the	libel,	driven	underground,	emerges	from	its	lurking	place	at	some	future	date,	he	must	be	able	to	point	to	a	sum	awarded	by	a	jury	sufficient	to	convince	a	bystander	of	the	baselessness	of	the	charge.182	The	House	of	Lords	emphasised	here	the	perception	of	the	ordinary	and	fair-minded	members	of	society	 as	 an	 intrinsic	 part	 of	 the	 legal	 claim	 of	 defamation	 and	 relevant	 to	 the	 presumed	damage.183	 This	 is	 what	 makes,	 in	 part,	 defamation	 ‘a	 distinctively	 sociological	 tort’.184	Consequently,	the	distinct	vindicatory	component	of	 libel	damages	is,	or	should	be,	concerned	with	restoring	the	relationship	between	the	claimant	and	the	community,	so	that	no	further	harm	arises	from	the	defamatory	publication.	By	contrast,	vindication	in	the	context	of	other	wrongs,	e.g.	nuisance,	is	concerned	primarily	with	the	reaffirmation	of	a	claimant’s	right,	rather	than	with	the	effect	of	the	remedy	on	third	parties.185	It	is	questionable	whether	a	public	declaration	alone	that	a	claimant	was	wronged	will	always	provide	full	or	sufficient	vindication	that	the	claimant	requires.	Damages	play	a	greater	role	in	the	common	law	than	in	other	systems186	and	are	an	important	aspect	of	obtaining	vindication.	They	 articulate	 the	 value	 of	 an	 injury	 to	 the	 claimant’s	 reputation,187	 calibrated	 to	 take	 into	account	the	circumstances	of	the	interested	parties	in	a	specific	context.	Although	an	award	of	damages	 for	 defamation	 may	 not	 be	 the	 most	 efficacious	 remedy	 available,188	 the	 public	perception	 of	 a	 just	 outcome	 in	 a	 libel	 dispute	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 influenced,	 even	 indirectly,	 by	knowledge	of	the	level	of	compensation	received.	The	quantitative	judgment	on	the	pound	scale	is	 deeply	 intertwined	 with	 the	 qualitative	 sentiment	 of	 gravity	 of	 the	 defendant’s	 tortious	conduct,	the	damage	caused	by	it	and	a	feeling	of	vindication;	in	other	words,	it	is	‘an	outward	and	visible	sign’189	that	the	law	was	on	the	claimant’s	side.	Judges’	idiosyncratic	intuition	that	a	reasoned	judgment	constitutes	itself	sufficient	vindication	and	can	relieve	the	implications	of	a	libel	is	based	on	a	supposition	which	may	be	unfounded.	It	arguably	ignores	the	realities	of	the	way	 in	 which	 libel	 awards	 actually	 impact	 on	 ordinary	 people’s	 perception	 of	 a	 successful	claimant.	Lay	observers	are	most	likely	to	access	a	stripped-down	version	of	a	judgment	through	secondary	sources	rather	than	read	a	detailed	version	of	it	thoroughly	and	attentively.																																																															181	Broome	(n	16).	182	Ibid	1071	(Lord	Hailsham).	183	Tolley	v	Fry	&	Sons	Ltd	[1931]	All	ER	131;	Morgan	v	Odhams	Press	Ltd	[1971]	1	WLR	1239;	Norman	v	
Future	Publishing	[1991]	EMLR	325.	184	Several	authorities	stress	that	reputation	refers	to	the	esteem	in	which	a	person	is	held	in	society;	see	
Plato	Films	Ltd	v	Speidel	[1961]	1	AC	1090,	1137-9	(Lord	Denning),	Rantzen	(n	17)	695-696	(Neill	LJ),	
McCarey	(n	42)	105	(Pearson	LJ);	see	also	Jerome	Skolnick,	‘The	Sociological	Tort	of	Defamation’	(1986)	74(3)	California	Law	Review	677.	185	Witzleb	and	Carroll	(n	54)	34-35.	186	Report	of	Committee	on	Defamation	(n	100)	paras	623–624.	187	John	(n	1)	607	(Sir	Thomas	Bingham	MR).	188	See	Rolph	(n	26)	297,	299.	189	Cleese	v	Clark	[2003]	EWHC	137,	[37]	(Eady	J);	Farrall	(n	37).	
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In	the	1964	case	of	Dingle,	Lord	Morton	remarked,	and	the	rest	of	their	Lordships	agreed,	that	a	judge	cannot	tell	how	widely	his	judgment	will	be	reported	and	read;	nor	can	he	tell	how	far	the	claimant’s	general	reputation	will	be	improved	by	condemning	the	defendant	or	even	expressing	a	favourable	opinion	of	the	claimant.190	More	recent	authorities	are	consistent	with	this	position.	In	Cairns	v	Modi,	which	concerned	a	defamatory	tweet	alleging	that	a	world-famous	cricketer	had	been	removed	from	the	Indian	Premier	League	auction	list	‘due	to	his	past	record	of	match-fixing’,	the	Lord	Chief	Justice	stated	that	most	people	would	be	‘rather	more	interested’191	in	finding	out	the	sum	awarded	by	the	court	to	the	claimant:	It	is	more	likely,	as	in	so	many	cases,	that	the	general	public	(or	rather,	interested	‘bystanders’	who	need	to	be	convinced)	will	be	concerned	to	discover	what	might	be	called	the	 ‘headline’	result.	What	most	people	want	to	know,	and	that	includes	those	who	read	the	judgment	closely	[…]	is	simply	‘how	much	did	[the	claimant]	get?’192		The	same	position	was	approved	in	later	cases,	such	as	Cruddas,	where	the	courts	acknowledged	with	unvarnished	honesty	 that	express	elements	of	vindication	 in	a	 judgment	are	 ‘unlikely	 to	achieve	very	much	 in	 themselves’193	and	were	mindful	 to	award	enough	 to	convince	any	 fair-minded	observer	of	the	baselessness	of	the	serious	allegations	advanced.194	Also,	in	Rai,195	where	a	member	of	the	congregation	of	a	Sikh	temple	was	awarded	£50,000	in	damages	following	the	defendant’s	failure	to	justify	allegations	of	stealing	from	the	temple’s	collection	box,	HHJ	Parkes	QC	attached	 little	weight	 to	 the	 impact	of	 the	reasoned	 judgment	of	 the	court:	although	there	might	have	been	some	reporting	of	it	in	the	local	press,	this	was	not	a	case	where	most	people	were	likely	to	read	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	court’s	judgment.		This	 approach	 supports	 the	 proposition	 that	 a	 higher	 libel	 award	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 claimant	 is	perhaps	more	likely	to	be	perceived	as	a	demonstrable	restoration	of	a	positive	public	image	than	a	lower	award.	It	is	therefore	not	a	great	leap	of	logic	to	suggest	that	there	is	a	strong	possibility	that	an	award	of	 some	magnitude	holds	greater	 restorative	power.196	And	vice	versa,	a	 lower	award	will	do	little	to	rebut	the	public	perception	that	the	reputational	damage	complained	of	was	as	serious	as	originally	asserted.	However,	the	wider	applicability	of	this	proposition	remains	open	to	empirical	enquiry	which	could	determine	whether	ordinary,	reasonable	publishees	 in	fact	associate	the	size	of	damages	awards	with	repaired	reputations.	In	Grobbelaar,	 Joseph	and	FlyMeNow,	 the	need	 for	vindication	was	exhausted	by	 the	reasoned	judgments,	thereby	eliminating	the	claimants’	compensation.	Pondering	the	reasoning	in	cases	like	Cairns,	Cruddas	 and	Rai,	we	are	however	 led	 to	a	 rather	paradoxical	position,	which	very	much	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 vindicatory	 effects	 of	 a	 reasoned	 judgment	 alone	 that	 judges	themselves	 have	 readily	 endorsed.	 While	 the	 judgments	 made	 by	 impartial	 arbiters	 of	 the	disputes	go	some	distance	to	vindicate	the	claimants’	reputation,	they	essentially	provide	only	some	 semblance	 of	 vindication	 and	 remain	 symbolically	 significant.	 The	 recovery	 of	 nominal																																																														190	Dingle	(n	32)	404.	191	Cairns	(n	15)	[31]	(Judge	LCJ).	192	Ibid.	193	Cruddas	v	Adams	(n	19)	[43]	(Eady	J).	194	Rahman	(n	18)	[106]	(the	sum	of	£185,000	was	awarded	following	a	defamatory	broadcasting	campaign).	195	Rai	(n	44)	[174].	196	Jeremy	Cohen	and	Sarah	Spears,	‘Newtonian	Communication:	Shaking	the	Libel	Tree	for	Empirical	Damages’	(1990)	67(1)	Journalism	and	Mass	Communication	Quarterly	51,	58.	
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damages	for	a	properly	pleaded	tortious	interference	in	this	context	cannot	be	neatly	harmonised	or	reconciled	with	the	strong	restorative	and	vindicatory	policy	that	underpins	 libel	damages.	The	claimants	in	Joseph	and	FlyMeNow	effectively	lost	their	action	to	destigmatise	their	names	and	 re-establish	 their	 standing	 in	 their	 respective	 communities.	 Notably,	 in	 Joseph,	 the	 court	determined	 costs	 in	 the	 defendants’	 favour,	 despite	 the	 claimants’	 success	 on	 liability.197	 Any	modicum	of	success	in	the	proceedings	was	thus	over-clouded	by	a	negative	cost	order	against	
The	Gillettes,	thereby	depriving	them	of	any	sense	of	vindication.		To	be	analytically	provocative,	it	is	worth	deliberating	on	the	existence	of	alternative	‘weapons’	in	 a	 libel	 court’s	 armoury	 that	 could	 be	 deployed	 by	 judges	 to	 express	 their	 discontent	with	claimants’	dishonest	conduct,	instead	of	depriving	them	of	an	award	of	substantial	damages.	As	Lord	Reed	remarked	in	his	2012	speech	‘Lies,	damned	lies’,	A	finding	at	[the	conclusion	of	the	trial]	that	a	document	was	forged	or	suppressed,	or	that	a	party	told	lies	in	his	evidence,	is	part	of	the	court’s	ordinary	adjudicative	function.	The	judge	may	decide	to	punish	the	party	for	contempt,	or	refer	the	case	to	the	prosecuting	authorities,	[or	penalise	a	party	in	relation	to	expenses	or	in	its	award	of	interest],	but	he	or	she	will	nevertheless	have	adjudicated	on	the	dispute.198	Contempt	proceedings	may	be	brought	against	a	person	if	he	or	she	makes,	or	causes	to	be	made,	a	false	statement	in	a	document	verified	by	a	statement	of	truth	without	an	honest	belief	in	its	truth.199	Early	 in	2018,	 for	 example,	 an	NHS	 trust	 successfully	brought	 contempt	proceedings	against	 a	 disk	 jockey	 who	 pursued	 a	 fraudulent	 claim	 for	 clinical	 negligence	 damages	 by	dishonestly	exaggerating	the	continuing	symptoms	and	disabling	effects	of	comparatively	minor	injuries	which	had	been	negligently	treated.200	Although	proceedings	for	contempt	of	court	are	evidently	considered	as	effective	sanctions	by	the	courts,201	it	is	quite	uncertain	how	far	claimants	bringing	dishonest	 claims	are	 in	 fact	deterred	by	 the	possibility	 that	 they	may	end	up	with	a	prison	sentence,	if	exposed.	Such	proceedings	may	only	be	brought	by	the	Attorney	General	or	with	the	permission	of	the	court.202	From	a	practitioner’s	perspective,	‘the	idea	that	the	Attorney	General	might	ever	get	round	to	taking	his	Fiat	out	of	the	governmental	garage	is	contradicted	by	experience.’203	 It	 may	 also	 be	 unrealistic	 to	 anticipate	 that	 the	 cheated	 party	 will	 vigorously	protect	the	court’s	public	process	by	pursuing	a	private	prosecution.204	Also,	even	if	the	trial	judge	hears	 both	 the	 permission	 to	 bring	 contempt	 proceedings	 and	 the	 proceedings	 themselves	 -	provided	 a	 permission	 is	 granted	 -	 additional	 private	 or	 public	 expenses	 are	 likely	 to	 be	accumulated	at	the	end,	including	the	public	expenditure	incurred	from	the	cost	of	a	prison	place	if	a	conviction	leads	to	imprisonment.205	Thus,	penalising	a	claimant	as	a	contemnor,	or	referring																																																														197	Joseph	v	Spiller	(Costs)	[2012]	EWHC	3278.	198	Lord	Reed,	‘Lies,	Damned	Lies’	(n	3)	2.	199	CPR	32.14(1).	200	Calderdale	and	Huddersfield	NHS	Foundation	Trust	v	Atwal	[2018]	EWHC	961.	201	South	Wales	Fire	and	Rescue	Service	v	Smith	[2011]	EWHC	1749,	[2]	–	[7]	(Moses	LJ),	endorsed	by	the	Supreme	Court	in	Summers	(n	8)	[58].	202	CPR	32.14(2).	203	William	Norris,	‘Look	out:	I’ve	got	a	power,	but	I	am	not	going	to	use	it’	(2012)	3	Journal	of	Personal	Injury	Law	169,	175.	204	Ibid.	205	The	average	annual	overall	cost	of	holding	a	prisoner	in	England	and	Wales	is	currently	estimated	£35,371;	Ministry	of	Justice,	Prison	performance	statistics	2016	to	2017	–	Costs	per	prison	place	and	cost	
per	prisoner	2016	to	2017,	Table	2a	<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/prison-performance-statistics-2016-to-2017>	accessed	28	June	2018.	
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the	matter	to	the	prosecuting	authorities,	may	not	be	the	most	economical	way	to	resolve	the	dispute.	Moreover,	a	claimant	who	secures	nominal	damages	will	not	necessarily	recover	costs.	The	Civil	Procedure	Rules	(CPR)	give	a	court	 full	power	and	wide	discretion	to	determine	the	extent	to	which	costs	are	to	be	paid	and	by	whom.206	As	Lord	Lloyd	of	Berwick	famously	said	in	the	House	of	Lords	decision	of	Bolton	MDC	v	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Environment:	‘as	in	all	questions	to	do	with	costs,	 the	fundamental	rule	 is	 that	there	are	no	rules’.207	 In	deciding	what	order	to	make	about	costs,	the	court	is	entitled	to	consider	all	the	circumstances,	including	the	manner	in	which	the	parties	 have	pursued	or	defended	particular	 allegations208	 and	 can	 exercise	 its	 discretion	against	 the	 successful	 party,	 if	 there	 is	 some	 reason	 connected	 with	 the	 case.209	 Ordering	dishonest	claimants	to	pay	costs	was	seen	by	the	Supreme	Court	in	Summers	as	a	means	to	achieve	effective	deterrence:	It	is	entirely	appropriate	[…]	to	order	the	claimant	to	pay	the	costs	of	any	part	of	the	process	which	have	been	caused	by	his	fraud	or	dishonesty	and	moreover	to	do	so	by	making	orders	for	costs	on	an	indemnity	basis.	Such	cost	orders	may	often	be	in	substantial	sums	perhaps	leaving	the	claimant	out	of	pocket.	It	seems	to	the	Court	that	the	prospect	of	such	orders	is	likely	to	be	a	real	deterrent.210	So,	if	a	dishonest	claimant	succeeds	and	receives	a	small	amount	of	damages,	he	or	she	will	have	presumably	achieved	vindication	 for	 the	 reputational	 injury,	but	 the	 court’s	 view	 in	Summers	means	in	practice	that	any	damages	recovered	may	be	minimal	when	set	against	the	costs	of	the	proceedings.	 Consequently,	 claimants	 would	 probably	 leave	 the	 court	 in	 a	 less	 prosperous	position	than	when	they	entered	it.	Whilst	a	pyrrhic	and	expensive	victory	is	viewed	in	Summers	as	 an	 essential,	 yet	pragmatic,	 compromise	where	 claimants	have	behaved	 inappropriately,	 it	might	reasonably	be	questioned	whether	this	is	a	price	worth	paying	in	the	context	of	libel.	The	cost	in	that	case	would	be	out	of	proportion	to	what	would	have	been	accomplished	in	terms	of	vindication.211	The	alternative	weapon	of	costs	added	to	the	court’s	armoury	by	Summers	does	not	seem	to	provide	a	fully	satisfactory	solution	in	libel	either.	Hence,	there	might	be	some	value	in	 the	suggestion	that	 the	serious	harm	threshold	under	s	1	could	be	extended	by	 including	a	requirement	 that	a	 case	proceeds	only	where	 there	 is	a	 real	prospect	of	vindication,	and	 that	vindication,	if	achieved	by	litigation,	is	proportionate	to	the	costs	of	the	trial.212	There	is	therefore	a	case	for	consideration	of	this	position	in	libel	law.	
Conclusions	Although	the	defence	tactic	to	bring	evidence	of	the	claimant’s	bad	reputation	in	mitigation	of	damages	used	to	be	tightly	controlled	by	the	courts,213	this	practice	was	relaxed	to	some	extent	by	Burstein.214	Since	then,	the	English	courts	appear	to	have	adopted	an	even	more	liberal	and																																																														206	Senior	Courts	Act	1981,	s	51	and	CPR	44.2(1).	207	[1995]	1	WLR	1176,	1178.	208	CPR	44.2(3)	and	CPR	44.2(4).	209	Donald	Campbell	v	Pollak	[1927]	AC	732,	812	(Viscount	Cave	LC).	210	Summers	(n	8)	[53]	(Lord	Clarke).	211	Jameel	v	Dow	Jones	(n	86),	[69]	(Eady	J).	212	Liberty,	Written	Evidence	in	Joint	Committee	on	the	Draft	Defamation	Bill,	Oral	and	Associated	Written	
Evidence,	Volume	II	(2010–12,	HL	203,	HC	930-II)	202.	213	Scott	(n	2).	214	Paul	Mitchell,	The	Making	of	the	Modern	Law	of	Defamation	(Hart	2005)	75.	
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broad-minded	 approach	 to	 admitting	 evidence	 of	 discreditable	 conduct	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	claimant	-	even	before	the	time	the	libel	was	published	-	so	long	as	specific	acts	or	omissions	are	directly	and	temporally	relevant	to	the	context	of	publication.215	It	could	be	suggested	that	the	claimants’	‘dishonesty’	before	action	or	‘disreputable’	conduct	of	their	case	at	trial	may	be	seen	as	a	criterion	that	potentially	expands	the	breadth	of	the	mitigating	factor	of	‘bad	reputation’	or	as	a	reiteration	of	this	factor	in	another	(dis)guise.	As	 the	 landscape	of	 legal	disputes	 around	 reputation	 continues	 to	 evolve,	 judges	 increasingly	seem	to	be	more	critical	in	their	reasoning	in	terms	of	closely	examining	and	boldly	denouncing	claimants’	 unmeritorious	 practices	 in	 pursuing	 their	 claims	 up	 until	 the	 time	 a	 judgment	 is	delivered.216	A	strong	message	is	therefore	sent	to	parties	who	falsely	assume	that	it	is	only	the	defendant’s	 conduct	 that	 is	 subject	 to	 scrutiny	 when	 damages	 are	 assessed.	 So,	 a	 claimant’s	conduct	 up	 to,	 and	 including,	 the	 trial	 is	 capable	 of	 reducing	 damages,	 just	 as	 a	 defendant’s	conduct	up	to,	and	including,	the	proceedings	can	aggravate	damages.	However,	 as	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 observed	 in	 Burstein,	 ‘every	 publication	 has	 a	 contextual	background,	even	if	the	publication	is	substantially	untrue’.217	If	it	is	accepted	that	a	claimant’s	unscrupulous	behaviour	in	litigation	can	be	considered	against	this	background,	the	absence	of	a	sufficiently	reliable	yardstick	against	which	this	factor	can	be	objectively	ascertained	may	mean	that	the	exclusionary	discretion	of	the	court	can	at	times	be	exercised	with	less	rigidity.	What	constitutes	dishonest	or	disreputable	conduct,	and	how	its	gravity	is	to	be	weighed	against	its	potential	 impact	 on	 the	 size	 of	 an	 appropriate	 award,	 remain	 unclear	 in	 this	 context.	 This	undesirable	 element	 of	 uncertainty	 calls	 for	 a	more	 coherent	 and	workable	 set	 of	 factors	 the	courts	can	weigh	in	making	that	determination.	An	unduly	liberal	approach	in	this	regard	might	be	exploited	by	defendants	who	may	seek	to	rely	on	evidence	of	specific	acts	or	omissions	on	the	part	 of	 the	 claimant	 in	 the	 litigation	 process	 and	 needlessly	 distract	 the	 court	 from	what	 is	‘directly	relevant’	background	context.	Whilst	painstakingly	and	critically	examining	claimants’	actions	in	the	past	and	conduct	of	their	case	at	trial	is	undoubtedly	a	well-intended	judicial	practice,	it	is	questionable	whether	a	nominal	award,	 accompanied	 by	 a	 reasoned	 judgment	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 claimant	 who	 has	 suffered	reputational	 damage	 but	 displayed	 reprehensible	 conduct	 before	 or	 during	 litigation,	 are	sufficient	 to	mark	 the	significance	of	 the	unlawful	 interference	with	 the	claimant’s	public	self.	Such	an	approach	carries	with	it	the	potential	unintended	consequence	of	eroding	the	vindicatory	element	of	an	award	and	stretches	nominal	damages	from	their	historically	intended	function.	This	concern	assumes	even	more	salience	against	the	backdrop	of	the	new	Defamation	Act	2013.	Considering	 the	 higher	 standard	 set	 by	 the	 serious	 harm	 requirement,	 it	may	 reasonably	 be	anticipated	that	a	claimant,	who	has	shown	that	the	defamatory	meaning	is	sufficiently	grave	to	cross	the	serious	harm	threshold,	is	even	more	deserving,	thus	meriting	an	enhanced	award	of	damages.	The	ripples	created	by	Grobbelaar	and	Joseph	seem	to	have	more	recently	found	their	way	into	
FlyMeNow.	However,	as	the	discussion	showed,	this	emerging	trend	in	relation	to	diminishing	a	dishonest	claimant’s	award	of	general	damages	does	not	maintain	consistency	with	other	tortious	causes	of	action,	thereby	failing	to	establish	a	degree	of	coherence	and	predictability	on	the	point.																																																														215	Turner	(n	104);	Goody	(n	101);	King	(n	101);	Oyston	(n	18).		216	Praed	v	Graham	(1889)	24	QBD	53,	55	(Lord	Esher	MR);	Broome	(n	16)	1071	(Lord	Hailsham).	217	Burstein	(n	106)	598.	
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The	position	 is	 further	complicated	by	the	 fact	 that	 there	seems	to	be	 little	certainty	over	 the	vindicatory	power	and	effect	of	the	terms	of	a	reasoned	judgment	alone.	On	the	one	hand,	it	has	been	asserted,	albeit	with	some	cautious	reservation,	that	vindication	of	a	successful	claimant’s	reputation	can	be	given	 in	the	reasons	for	the	 judgment.218	But,	on	the	other,	 the	 force	of	 this	argument	is	somewhat	undercut	by	the	Lord	Chief	Justice’s	surprisingly	candid	remarks	in	Cairns	
v	Modi	about	the	extent	to	which	a	reasoned	judgment	can	offer	complete	vindication,	especially	if	it	is	accepted	that	lay	observers	will	be	less	interested	in	closely	reading	a	judgment	and	will,	instead,	draw	their	own	inferences	from	the	size	of	the	award.		Where	 claimants	 have	 misconducted	 themselves,	 but	 injury	 has	 been	 caused	 by	 the	 words	complained	 of,	 nominal	 awards	 do	 not	 truly	 operate	 fairly,	 especially	 because	 there	 is	 a	 real	possibility	that	the	public	perception	of	their	reputation	has	been	tainted	by	negligible	damages.	Minimal	awards	will	merely	be	of	a	trumpery	character	in	this	context	and	are	unlikely	to	be	well-suited	 to	eradicate	 the	adverse	consequence	which	could	arise	 from	the	 future	disrespect	 the	claimant	might	face	as	a	result	of	the	libellous	publication	that	can	be	lasting	and	widespread.	At	least	 as	 far	 as	 personal	 injury	 cases	 are	 concerned,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 decision	 in	 Summers	indicates	 that	 there	 is	 a	 particularly	 robust	 appetite	 for	 exploring	 different	 sanctions	 against	claimants’	dishonesty.	However,	the	alternative	‘weapons’	in	the	courts’	arsenal,	as	outlined	in	
Summers,	 are	 attended	 with	 serious	 corresponding	 disadvantages	 and	 do	 not	 offer	 a	 wholly	sustainable	solution	in	the	context	of	libel.	Whether	the	reasons	for	judgment	alone	can	provide	sufficient	vindication	in	the	circumstances	of	a	case	and	form	the	basis	for	lessening	the	quantum	of	damages	must	remain	a	nuanced,	fact-specific	inquiry	into	the	particularised	circumstances	of	a	case.	This	needs	to	be	guided	throughout	by	a	clear	and	solid	framework	for	decision-making,	which	 embodies	 the	 attractive	 idea	 that	 the	 fundamental	 importance	 of	 the	 protected	reputational	interests	itself	may	justify	a	substantial	award	to	mark	their	infringement,	so	as	to	ensure	that	the	vindicatory	purpose	and	merits	of	libel	damages	are	not	lost	sight	of.				
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